A statistical approach to market equilibrium and efficiency analysis is proposed in this paper. One factor that governs the exchange decisions of traders in a market, named willingness price, is highlighted and constitutes the whole theory. The supply and demand functions are formulated as the distributions of corresponding willing exchange over the willingness price. The laws of supply and dem...

In this article, an exact levy solution is presented for bending analysis of a functionally graded (FG) annular sector plate. The governing equilibrium equations are obtained based on the classical plate theory. Introducing an analytical method for the first time, the three coupled governing equilibrium equations are replaced by an independent equation in term of transverse deflection. This equ...

A formalism called partial equilibrium logic (PEL) has recently been proposed as a logical foundation for the well-founded semantics (WFS) of logic programs. In PEL one defines a class of minimal models, called partial equilibrium models, in a non-classical logic, HT . On logic programs partial equilibrium models coincide with Przymusinski’s partial stable (p-stable) models, so that PEL can be ...

In [4] a nonmonotonic formalism called partial equilibrium logic (PEL) was proposed as a logical foundation for the well-founded semantics (WFS) of logic programs. PEL consists in de ning a class of minimal models, called partial equilibrium (p-equilibrium), inside a non-classical logic called HT 2. In [4] it was shown that, on normal logic programs, p-equilibrium models coincide with Przymusin...

We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange with some neighbors, although its cost function possibly depends on strategies of all agents. The few existing methods build projected pseudo-gradient dynamics, and require either double-layer iterations or conservative conditions step sizes. To overcome bot...

We consider for the first time a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem, i.e., with expected-value cost functions and joint feasibility constraints, under partial-decision information, meaning that agents communicate only some trusted neighbors. propose several distributed algorithms network games aggregative we show being special instances of preconditioned forward–backward splitting ...