We consider the problem of devising incentive strategies for viral marketing of a product. In particular, we assume that the seller can influence penetration of the product by offering two incentive programs: a) direct incentives to potential buyers (influence) and b) referral rewards for customers who influence potential buyers to make the purchase (exploit connections). The problem is to dete...

BACKGROUND Stroke may lead to several health problems, but positive effects can be promoted by learning to perform physical therapy techniques correctly. OBJECTIVE To compare two different types of observational practice (video instructions and demonstration by a physical therapist) during the use of incentive spirometry (IS). METHOD A total of 20 patients with diagnosis of stroke and 20 he...

We consider the problem of devising incentive strategies for viral marketing of a product. In particular, we assume that the seller can influence penetration of the product by offering two incentive programs: a) direct incentives to potential buyers (influence) and b) referral rewards for customers who influence potential buyers to make the purchase (exploit connections). The problem is to dete...

With progressing technologies and new features of production, new products compete with older ones in markets. Indeed, new products initiate contest with olden ones and this process repeats in different productions lifetime several times. In this situation recycling the olden products seems to be significant for supply chains. Governments often levy special tariffs for these products as a contr...

This paper examines the joint hypotheses that firms set optimal levels for CEO incentives, and that firms and CEOs jointly correct deviations from these optimal levels through equity grants and CEO portfolio rebalancing. I investigate two equity-based CEO incentives, pay-forperformance sensitivity and risk-taking incentive. Pay-for-performance sensitivity is defined as the change in CEO wealth ...

Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper studies the design of self-enforced relational contracts. I show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form, but that self-enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision. With hidden informa...

Abstract: This paper designs an incentive contract menu to achieve long-term stability for electricity prices in a day-ahead electricity market. A bi-level Stackelberg game model is proposed to search for the optimal incentive mechanism under a one-leader and multi-followers gaming framework. A multi-agent simulation platform was developed to investigate the effectiveness of the incentive mecha...

The paper first differentiates “control” and “incentive”. Then it shows that integration in which the principal gets ownership of the physical assets necessary for the agent to create values enhances control of the principal over the agent’s human capital and thus improve coordination ex post, but that reduces the agent’s ex ante incentive to make human capital investment and ex post incentive ...

In the E-commerce Service Supply Chain (ESSC), knowledge sharing among members is crucial for fast responses to the changing online market. We propose a knowledge sharing incentive model for the ESSC by incorporating knowledge complementarity and integration capacity. We develop two principal-agent based optimal incentive mechanisms for the ESSC under asymmetric information, when service provid...

We study a principal-agent problem with multiple identical agents, where the action-dependent stochastic relationship between actions and output is perceived to be ambiguous, and agents are ambiguity averse. We argue that ambiguity, and particularly ambiguity aversion, make it more attractive for the principal to choose a tournament. If agents are risk neutral, but ambiguity averse, we show tha...