The paper studies the impacts of learning behaviour of electrical-power suppliers on electricity-spot-market equilibrium under repeated linear supply-function bidding. In the markets, the supplier will conduct ‘learning’ to improve his strategic bidding in order to obtain greater profit. Therefore, it is significant to explore the impacts of such learning behaviour on market equilibria and mark...

We investigate games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets as proposed by Konishi and Ünver (Soc Choice Welfare, in press). While Konishi and Ünver (Soc Choice Welfare, in press) show that there may not exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in general, there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in such a game. We show that every hospital weakly prefers a Nash equilibrium to a...

We study the problem of allocating items to two agents with arbitrary valuation functions. Instead of actual money, we use sequential auctions with “scrip money”, i.e. money that has no value outside the auction. By considering such scrip auctions as a special case of more general bidding games, we show that there exists a natural pure subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (PSPE) with the following ...

In this paper the problem of developing bidding strategies for the participants of dynamic oligopolistic electricity markets is studied. Attention is given to strategic bidding of load serving entities (LSE) in these markets. We model oligopolistic electricity markets as non-linear dynamical systems and use discrete-time Nash bidding strategies. We assume a Cournot model for our game, where the...

We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of restructured electricity markets, with locational marginal prices. Each player in this game faces a bilevel optimization problem that we model as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, MPEC. The corresponding game is an example of an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints, EPEC. We establish sufficient conditions ...

Nash Cournot Equilibrium (NCE) has been widely used in a competitive electricity market to analyze generation firms’ strategic production quantities. Congestion on a transmission network may lead to a mixed strategy NCE. Mixed strategy is complicated to understand, difficult to compute, and hard to implement in practical market. However, Stackelberg model based equilibrium does not have any mix...

In actual electricity market, which operates repeatedly on the basis of one hour or half hour, each firm might learn or estimate other competitors’ strategic behaviors from available historical market operation data, and rationally aims at its maximum profit in the repeated biddings. A conjectural variation based learning method is proposed in this paper for generation firm to improve its strat...

ii RED-BORDERED FORM iii ABSTRACT This dissertation presents a new algorithm that allows a market participant to maximize its individual welfare in the electricity spot market. The use of such an algorithm in determining market equilibrium points, called Nash equilibria, is also demonstrated. The start of the algorithm is a spot market model that uses the optimal power flow (OPF), with a full r...

This paper studies the auction-driven dynamic spectrum access in cognitive radio networks with heterogeneous secondary users, who have different risk attitudes. First, a game theoretic framework is established for auction-driven dynamic spectrum access in cognitive radio networks. The utility functions and bidding strategies of heterogeneous secondary users are defined, and the parameterized au...

With the onset of large numbers of energy-flexible appliances, in particular plug-in electric and hybrid-electric vehicles, a significant portion of electricity demand will be somewhat flexible and accordingly may be responsive to changes in electricity prices. In the future, this increased degree of demand flexibility (and the onset of only short-term predictable intermittent renewable supply)...