A lockdown due to Covid-19 virus, which restricted the right gather, was announced by Government of Republic Lithuania in March 2020. The severely affected activity public and private limited liability companies’ body – general meeting shareholders, i. e. manager’s had find alternative ways organize shareholders that would not pose a risk shareholders’ health pandemic situation.In this article ...

This paper studies the advisory role of a target company board in takeovers. I show that coordination failures among target shareholders, such as free-riding, limit the board’s ability to properly advise shareholders whether accepting a takeover o¤er is in their best interest based on its information. Even if there are no agency problems and the board’s objective is to maximize shareholders’val...

We present a new protocol for the verifiable redistribution of secrets from (m,n) to (m,n) access structures for threshold sharing schemes. Our protocol enables the addition or removal of shareholders and also guards against mobile adversaries that cause permanent damage. We observe that existing protocols either cannot be readily extended to allow redistribution between different access struct...

We argue the necessity of universally veriiable secret sharing for secrets as individual users' cryptographic keys, and propose protocols to realize such secret sharing for two most common public-key cryptosystems: discrete logarithm based and integer factorization based. The universal veriiabil-ity achieves sharing secret with multi third parties as shareholders using two-party protocols in wh...

The General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) is the organ company that has highest authority in company, and all decisions relating to are stipulated through GMS after certain conditions have been met as laws regulations. purpose this research find out implementation Extraordinary (EGMS) legal consequences Implementation organized by PT. KOLINGKAS terms Law Number 40 2007 concerning Limited Liabil...

We integrate heterogeneity and uncertainty in investor valuations into a model of takeovers. Investors have dispersed valuations, holding shares in firms they value more highly, and a successful offer must win approval from the median target shareholder. We derive the consequences for an acquiring firm’s takeover offer—its size and cash/equity structure—and implications for takeover premia and ...