A crowding game is a noncooperative game in which the payo¤ of each player depends only on the player’s action and the size of the set of players choosing that particular action: The larger the set, the smaller the payo¤. Finite, n-player crowding games often have multiple equilibria. However, a large crowding game generically has just one equilibrium, and the equilibrium payo¤s in such a game ...

abstract a quantitative framework of combination of liner programming and cooperative game theory was used in this study to analyze and model cooperative contracts in production based on rural households' resources cooperation in firoozabad plain. revenues and costs in cooperation game theory have important rule to get agreement. transaction cost function was used in cooperative costs accountin...

1. The Intuitive Criterion (Cho & Kreps, 1987) This paper analyzes a simple signaling model that has applications throughout information economics. There are two players: a Sender of information (S) and a Receiver of information (R). The timing of the game is: (1) nature draws a type for S, denoted t ∈ T, according to the probability distribution p(t); (2) S privately observes the type t and th...

Replacing associated consistency in Hamiache’s axiom system by dual similar associated consistency, we axiomatize the Shapley value as the unique value verifying the inessential game property, continuity and dual similar associated consistency. Continuing the matrix analysis for Hamiache’s axiomatization of the Shapley value, we construct the dual similar associated game and introduce the dual ...

This thesis provides a new geometric-combinatorial construction to characterise the Nash equilibria of a non-degenerate bimatrix game and their indices. Considering a non-degenerate m× n bimatrix game, the construction yields an (m− 1)-simplex X4 that is simplicially divided into (m−1)-simplices, reflecting the best reply structure of player II. Each (m− 1)-simplex in the triangulation is divid...

This article proves the following result: Let G and G′ be graphs of orders n and n′, respectively. Let G∗ be obtained from G by adding to each vertex a set of n′ degree 1 neighbors. If G∗ has game coloring number m and G′ has acyclic chromatic number k, then the Cartesian product G G′ has game chromatic number at most k(k+m − 1). As a consequence, the Cartesian product of two forests has game c...

We study how group size a ects cooperation in an in nitely repeated n-player Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. In each repetition of the game, groups of size n ≤ M are randomly and anonymously matched from a xed population of size M to play the n-player PD stage game. We provide conditions for which the contagious strategy (Kandori, 1992) sustains a social norm of cooperation among allM players. Ou...

We prove that an equilibrium of a nondegenerate bimatrix game has index +1 if and only if it can be made the unique equilibrium of an extended game with additional strategies of one player. The main tool is the “dual construction”. A simplicial polytope, dual to the common best-response polytope of one player, has its facets subdivided into best-response regions, so that equilibria are complete...

Parrondo game, which introduction is inspired by the flashing Brownian ratchet, presents an apparently paradoxical situation where there are ways to combine two losing games into a winning one. The original Parrondo game consists of two individual games, game A and game B. Game A is a slightly losing coin-tossing game. Game B has two coins, with an integer parameter M. If the current cumulative...