Interference across competing firms in RCTs can be informative about market structure. An experiment that subsidizes a random subset of traders who buy cocoa from farmers Sierra Leone illustrates this idea. Interpreting treatment-control differences prices and quantities purchased through model Cournot competition reveals differentiation between is low. Combining result with quasi-experimental ...

We consider platform competition for small users and a user group. One enjoys quality advantage the other benefits from favorable beliefs. study whether group mitigates users’ coordination problem—i.e., joining low-quality because they believe that would do same. find can facilitate on high-quality may choose to maintain dominance of one. Users’ utility is non-monotonic in proportion Finally, w...

Traders are often blamed for high prices, prompting government regulation. We study the effects of a ban layer financing intermediaries in edible oil supply chain Bangladesh during 2011–2012. Contrary to predictions standard model an oligopolistic chain, caused downstream wholesale and retail prices rise, pass-through changes imported crude price fall. These results can be explained by extensio...

We investigate whether or not ex post destruction can solve the hold-up problem. After clarifying the difference between ex post destruction and nontrade when negotiation breaks down, we show that the option of ex post destruction is not sufficient to enhance ex ante efficiency. In particular, only if the information about the spitefulness of the supplier is coarse enough, will the option of ex...

We examine a variety of stability and equilibrium de…nitions that have been used to study the formation of social networks among a group of players. In particular we compare variations on three types of de…nitions: those based on a pairwise stability notion, those based on the Nash equilibria of a link formation game, and those based on equilibria of a link formation game where transfers are po...

We study infinitely repeated two player games with perfect information, where each period consists of two stages: one in which the parties simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. We first derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Paretooptimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. Afterwards, we examine...

This article discusses the limitations of the orthodox economic theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts. Various experimental studies have shown that the aggregation of individuals in groups changes behavior and preferences systematically. This perspective has been formalized by models of interdependent preferences. Based on a prominent approach of interdependent preferences, intention-based...

This paper endogenizes the timing of bilateral contracting between one principal and multiple agents in the presence of externalities. Contracting simultaneously with all agents is optimal for the principal if externalities become weaker the more an agent trades. If instead externalities become stronger, sequential negotiations might benefit the principal as they lower the agents’ outside optio...

Using monthly data on temporary trade barriers (TTBs), we estimate the dynamic employment effects of protectionism through vertical production linkages. First, exploiting high-frequency and TTB procedural details, identify policy shocks exogenous to economic fundamentals. We then use input-output tables construct measures affecting downstream producers. Finally, panel local projections using id...