Wireless sensor networks is composed of a large number of randomly deployed sensor nodes with limited computing ability and memory space. These characteristics gives rise to much challenge to key agreement. General key agreement schemes like KDC, PKI and Diffie-Hellman key exchange schemes are not applicable to the sensor networks. Several key distribution schemes have been proposed specificall...

Design a Secure Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol is a wide research area. Many works have been done in this field and remain few open problems. Design an AKE-secure without NAXOS approach is remaining as an open problem. NAXOS approach [18] is used to hide the ephemeral secret key from an adversary even if the adversary in somehow may obtain the ephemeral secret key. Using NAXOS approa...

This document defines a generic way for Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) to use any of the symmetric secure password authentication methods. Multiple methods are already specified in other documents, and this document does not add any new one. This document specifies a way to agree on which method is to be used in the current connection. This document also provides a common way to transm...

In this paper, we describe a brand new key exchange protocol based on a semidirect product of (semi)groups (more specifically, on extension of a (semi)group by automorphisms), and then focus on practical instances of this general idea. Our protocol can be based on any group, in particular on any non-commutative group. One of its special cases is the standard Diffie-Hellman protocol, which is ba...

This document describes a way to avoid IP fragmentation of large Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) messages. This allows IKEv2 messages to traverse network devices that do not allow IP fragments to pass through. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at in effect on the date of publication of this docum...

In this paper we study a key exchange protocol similar to the DiffieHellman key exchange protocol, using abelian subgroups of the automorphism group of a non-abelian nilpotent group. We also generalize group no. 92 of the Hall-Senior table [16] to an arbitrary prime p and show that, for those groups, the group of central automorphisms is commutative. We use these for the key exchange we are stu...

A new formal security model for session key exchange protocols in the public key setting is proposed, and several eecient protocols are analyzed in this model. The relationship between this new model and previously proposed models is explored, and several interesting, subtle distinctions between static and adaptive adversaries are explored. We also give a brief account of anonymous users.

The aim of this technical report is to complement the work in [To et al. 2014] by proposing a Group Key Exchange protocol so that the Querier and TDSs (and TDSs themselves) can securely create and exchange the shared key. Then, the security of this protocol is formally proved using the game-based model. Finally, we perform the comparison between this protocol and other related works.

In this work, we introduce an active attack on a Group Key Exchange protocol by Burmester and Desmedt. The attacker obtains a copy of the shared key, which is created in a collaborative manner with the legal users in a communication group.

Several group key protocols have been presented in the literature to enable secrecy of communication among dynamic groups of participants. However, there is a lack of consistency in the literature in terms of operations supported and performance metrics of the various protocols. This makes it difficult for designers to choose the best protocol for their specific applications. To alleviate this ...