We study two player reachability-price games on single-clock timed automata. The problem is as follows: given a state of the automaton, determine whether the first player can guarantee reaching one of the designated goal locations. If a goal location can be reached then we also want to compute the optimum price of doing so. Our contribution is twofold. First, we develop a theory of cost functio...

Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-bytwo factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity (an outside seller versus collective ownership) ...

We obtain revenue guarantees for the simple pricing mechanism of a single posted price, in terms of a natural parameter of the distribution of buyers’ valuations. Our revenue guarantee applies to the single item n buyers setting, with values drawn from an arbitrary joint distribution. Specifically, we show that a single price drawn from the distribution of the maximum valuation Vmax = max{V1, V...

Option price data is often used to infer risk-neutral densities for future prices of an underlying asset. Given the prices of a set of options on the same underlying asset with different strikes and maturities, we propose a nonparametric approach for estimating risk-neutral densities associated with several maturities. Our method uses bicubic splines in order to achieve the desired smoothness f...

Option price data is often used to infer risk-neutral densities for future prices of an underlying asset. Given the prices of a set of options on the same underlying asset with different strikes and maturities, we propose a nonparametric approach for estimating the evolution of the risk-neutral density in time. Our method uses bicubic splines in order to achieve the desired smoothness for the e...

We study two reservation deposit policies for a service rm to increase its revenue through higher capacity utilization. First, under the no deposit policy, the rm requires no reservation deposit and imposes no no show penalty. Anticipating potential no shows, a rm may overbook; hence, there is no guarantee that the reserved service will be provided under the no deposit policy. On the contrary, ...

This paper studies households making joint decisions about two tax-deductible activities: charitable giving and paying interest on home equity lines of credit (HELOC). By allowing for interactions, either substitutability or complementarity, between deductions, I provide a fuller understanding of the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) and the tax-price elasticity of charitable giving. The tax-p...

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