This paper studies an international tax policy design problem by employing a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets. We investigate the possibility of welfareimproving active tax policies, in particular capital and labor income tax, under the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and the cooperative equilibrium. Unlike the conventional wisdom regarding stabilizat...

This paper presents a general equilibrium model of a two-sector production economy with irreversible real investment. Irreversibility of investment is the most prominent feature of the productive sector. It restricts capital accumulation, affecting firms’ investment decisions, which in turn determine properties of asset prices. Thus, this model provides a framework for connecting stock returns ...

We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the constituent games. JEL classification: C72; C73; C78.

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. JEL classification: D72, D74, D82, C72

We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e40: This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established. r 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. J...

We estimate the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) on United Kingdom data. Our estimates suggest that price stickiness is a more important source of nominal rigidity in the U.K. than wage stickiness. Our estimates of parameters governing investment behavior are only well behaved when post-1979 observations are included, which reflects govern...

In this paper we argue that the number of candidates running for public office, their ideological differentiation, and the intensity of campaign competition are all naturally intertwined, and jointly determined in response to the incentives provided by the electoral system. We propose a simple general equilibrium model that integrates these elements in a unitary framework, and provide a compari...

This paper formulates and analyzes a general model of elections in which candidates receive private signals about voters’ preferences prior to committing to political platforms. We fully characterize the unique pure-strategy equilibrium: After receiving her signal, each candidate locates at the median of the distribution of the median voter’s location, conditional on the other candidate receivi...

Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium The paper presents a general equilibrium model of search unemployment that incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms maximize profits while recognizing that the compensation package may affect the queue of job applicants...

This paper advocates computable general equilibrium (CGE) models as an analytical framework that is suitable for assessing the impacts of policy interference on the three dimensions of Sustainable Development, i.e. environmental quality, economic performance and equity. Methodological extensions of standard CGE models are illustrated that may strengthen the role of CGE models in measuring polic...