This paper explores the similarity and differences between the credibility problem of monetary policy and the under-investment problem of price regulation. In both cases reputational solutions are possible provided that the policymaker is sufficiently far-sighted. But even if regulators are far-sighted, this solution to the investment problem is undermined if capital depreciates slowly. Flexibl...

I present a tractable dynamic model of political economy where disagreements about the composition of public spending result in implementation of short-sighted policies. The relative price of investment to consumption is excessively large in equilibrium due to over-taxation. Investment rates are too low which slows down growth along the transition. In the long run, this results in output, consu...

Sticky-price models often suggest that relative price distortion is a major cost of in‡ation. We provide an intuition for this: Even at low rates, in‡ation strongly a¤ects price dispersion which in turn has an impact on the economy qualitatively similar to, and of the order of magnitude of, a negative shift in productivity. The utility cost of price dispersion is quanti…ed and its impact on opt...

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the EMU context depend on the particular characteristics...

This case study of fiscal sustainability in Turkey after the crisis in 2001 reviews and extends quantitative approaches to fiscal sustainability analysis and brings them together in a user-friendly tool applicable in a data-sparse environment. It combines a dynamic simulations approach with a steady-state consistency approach. It also incorporates user-defined stress tests and stochastic simula...

This paper analyzes the pros and cons of both the integrated and the specialized approaches to financial supervision. The theoretical arguments are discussed considering some recent experiences around the world and having the Latin American and the Caribbean context as a frame. Based on the analysis of the efficacy and the efficiency of each approach to fulfill the main objectives of financial ...

In a two person game, the Liar strategy falsifies or subverts the predictable outcomes of the other person’s strategy. Following the Gödelian argument of Binmore(1987), we prove that the best response to the Liar strategy in the Nash equilibrium of the game are surprise strategies. Computable game theory permits the surprise/innovation to be modelled by a total computable best response function...

We analyze an equilibrium concept called revision-proofness for infinite-horizon games played by a dynasty of players. Revision-proofness requires strategies to be robust to joint deviations by multiple players and is a refinement of sub-game perfection. Sub-game perfect paths that can only be sustained by reversion to paths with payoffs below those of an alternative path are not revision-proof...

The framework of a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model is used to study the optimal design of an unemployment insurance (UI) scheme and preferences for unemployment policy reforms. In a first step, the optimal defined benefit and defined replacement ratio UI systems are obtained in simulations. Then, the question whether switching to such an optimal system from the status quo would be...

This paper revisits a well-known case of optimal fiscal policy in a Ramsey model where consumer utility is defined over consumption and public goods. We show that normalising the size of the population to one eliminates the scope for active policy-making since the decentralised equilibrium coincides with social planning. Then, we modify the model to allow for a population of N > 1 agents, where...