Article history: Received 28 September 2005 Available online 30 November 2008 JEL classification: C72 C73

We analyze the infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. The efficient outome can be approximated in any prisoners’ dilemma game, while every individually rational feasible payoff can be approximated in a class of prisoner dilemma games. Our results require that monitoring be sufficiently accurate but do not require very low discounting.

1. Dilemmas generated by a rational approach to conflict 2. Reaction to the dilemmas; metagame theory 3. Dilemmas of agreement and disagreement; metagame analysis 4. From metagame analysis to drama theory 5. The six phases of conflict resolution 5.1. The scene-setting phase 5.2. The build-up phase 5.3. The climax phase 5.4. The conflict phase 5.5. The resolution phase 5.6.The implementation pha...

in a recent article, mannion and davies argue that there are a multitude of ways in which organizations (such as the national health service [nhs]) can deal with wrongdoing or ethical problems, including the formation of policies that encourage and protect would-be whistleblowers. however, it is important to distinguish internal reporting about wrongdoing from whistleblowing proper, because the...

We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner’s Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that historical precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two repeated games. We find that a precedent for efficient play in the repeated Stag Hunt game does not carry ...