A sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of a public signal. We show that the sender cannot benefit from becoming an expert, that is, from privately learning some information about the state. We then show that in some instances an uninformed sender is ex-ante strictly better off than an expert sender. JEL classification: D83.

We study optimal auctions when contacting prospective bidders is costly and the bidders’ values are correlated. Although full surplus extraction is in general impossible, we can construct a search mechanism that fully extracts the surplus with an arbitrarily high probability. JEL Classification: D44, D82, D83

We study the speed of social learning, when two players learn from private signals as well as the actions of the other. Our main finding is that increased interaction between the agents can lower the rate of learning: learning is significantly slower when both players observe each other, than when one only observes the other. JEL classifications: C73, D82, D83

This paper shows that even if all consumers face search costs, if these are below a certain level dependent upon the firm numbers and demand elasticity, the Diamond-type equilibrium with all prices at the monopoly level fails to exist. JEL Classification: D83, D11,

Common knowledge of a Borel event is shown to be a co-analytic event, and is therefore universally measurable. An extension of Aumann’s “agreement theorem” regarding common knowledge of posterior probabilities is proved in the framework of a measure space defined on a complete, separable, σ-compact metric space. JEL classification: D82, D83, D84

This paper studies the effects of increasing the number of sellers on Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) prices in homogeneous product Bertrand oligopoly markets. We show that the two most commonly used choice functions (power and logistic) lead to qualitatively different comparative-static predictions with respect to the relationship between number of firms and prices. JEL Numbers: C73, D83, L13

We show in a sender-receiver game with strictly opposing interests that rewards enhance trust but do not influence truth-telling. Subjects who reward tend to tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of reward opportunities. The amount of obtained rewards thereby enhances truth-telling. JEL Classification: C72, C73, D83.

This paper uses job seekers’ elicited beliefs about finding to disentangle the sources of decline in job-finding rates by duration unemployment. We document that have strong predictive power for finding, but are not revised downward when remaining unemployed and subject optimistic bias, especially long-term unemployed. Leveraging beliefs, we find substantial heterogeneity with resulting dynamic...

The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper, we study setting multiple senders in which is restricted choosing, at interim stage, one whom interact. Our main result that whenever are uncertain about each other’s pref...

I consider issues in distributed computation that should be of relevance to game theory. In particular, I focus on (a) representing knowledge and uncertainty, (b) dealing with failures, and (c) specification of mechanisms.  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D80; D83