It is shown that interim dynamically consistent trade may be supported among agents who have resolute (non-consequential) choice preferences.  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D81; D82; D84

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer’s objective function. JEL D21, D44, D45, D82.

Article history: Received 24 August 2014 Received in revised form 28 February 2015 Accepted 2 March 2015 Available online 10 March 2015 JEL classifications: C93 D01 D82 K42 PsycINFO classifications: 3120 3450 3660

We compare a credit rating agency’s incentives to acquire costly information when it is only paid for giving favorable ratings the corresponding agency up-front, i.e., irrespective of assigned. show that, in presence moral hazard, contingent fees provide stronger dynamic than up-front and may induce higher social welfare. When fee structure chosen by agency, arise as an equilibrium outcome, lin...

This paper characterizes public and private monitoring technologies with respect to which the efficient outcome is approximately implementable in team production by way of ex post budget-balanced linear transfers. JEL Classification: D21, D23, D82.

The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper, we study setting multiple senders in which is restricted choosing, at interim stage, one whom interact. Our main result that whenever are uncertain about each other’s pref...

We study two-player games where one-sided asymmetric information can lead to either adverse or advantageous selection. contrast behavior in these with settings both players are uninformed. find stark differences, suggesting that subjects do account for endogenous selection effects. Removing strategic uncertainty increases the fraction of who Subjects respond more than Using additional treatment...

Abstract Certification by analysts on a FinTech platform that harnesses the “wisdom of crowds” is associated with successful initial coin offerings (ICOs). We show favorable ratings group diverse backgrounds positively predict fundraising success and long-run token performance. Analysts’ also help detect potential fraud ex ante. document have career concerns are incentivized to issue informativ...