Climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: each failure to agree on how to share the costs of climate change mitigation increases the odds of significant economic loss for the negotiating parties. Nonetheless, no existing climate bargaining model includes this characteristic feature. We introduce a novel bargaining game that incorporates collective risk, and ...

This article addresses the challenges raised by introduction of algorithmic management and artificial intelligence in world work, focusing on risks that new managerial technologies present for fundamental rights principles, such as non-discrimination, freedom association right to privacy. The argues collective bargaining is most suitable regulatory instrument responding these challenges, curren...

Roth (1977) axiomatized the Nash (1950) bargaining solution without Pareto optimality. His result is considered an improvement on Nash’s original one, since it dispenses with notions of collective rationality. Several variants of Roth’s result have been obtained in a line of subsequent works. However, all of them rely on Nash’s (1950) independence axiom. Whether or how collective rationality ca...