We discuss some new algorithmic and complexity issues in coalitional and dynamic/evolutionary games, related to the understanding of modern selfish and Complex networks. In particular: (a) We examine the achievement of equilibria via natural distributed and greedy approaches in networks. (b) We present a model of a coalitional game in order to capture the anarchy cost and complexity of construc...

By a game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard cooperative non-transferable utility game described by a nonempty set of payo®s for each coalition of players. It is well-known that balancedness is a su±cient condition for the nonemptiness of the core of such a cooperative non-transferable utility game. But any information on the internal organization of the c...

Cooperation among automated agents is becoming increasingly important in various artificial intelligence applications. Coalitional (i.e., cooperative) game theory supplies conceptual and mathematical tools useful in the analysis of such interactions, and in particular in the achievement of stable outcomes among self-interested agents. Here, we study the minimal external subsidy required to stab...

The term “green networking” refers to energy-efficient networking technologies and products, while minimizing resource usage as possible. This thesis targets the problem of resource allocation in small cells networks in a green networking context. We develop algorithms for different paradigms. We exploit the framework of coalitional games theory and some stochastic geometric tools as well as th...

1 The issue of group-blind multiuser detection in MAC channel among wireless nodes in the environment of multiple networks coexisting and sharing spectrum is addressed under the Framework of coalitional game. We investigate the performance and stability of multiple access channel (MAC) with linear decorrelating multiuser detection under varying SNR, channel gains and coalitional structures, in ...

A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core—the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using external paym...

The Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and other voting power indices measure the importance of a player in a coalitional game. We consider a simple coalitional game called the spanning connectivity game (SCG) based on an undirected, unweighted multigraph, where edges are players. We examine the computational complexity of computing the voting power indices of edges in the SCG. It is shown tha...

Coalition structures are partitions of agents, i.e., collections of pair-wise disjoint coalitions, called blocks, whose union yields the entire population. Given a coalitional game, assigning a worth to each coalition, the worth of coalition structures obtains as the sum of blocks’ worth. Optimal coalition structures have maximal worth. For generic coalitional game, searching optimal coalition ...

In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitional stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the...

By the end of last century there were four areas in mathematical theory positional differential games: non-coalitional games, cooperative, hierarchical and, finally, least-understood coalitional games. In their turn, games are divided into with transferable payoffs (games side payments when players can split profits course game) and non-transferable no such distributions for this or that reason...