We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occurring out of equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications: C62—Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium D51—Exchange and Production Economies D58—Computable and Other Applied Gener...

We consider a linear stochastic univariate rational expectations model, with a predetermined variable, and provide alternative representations of SSEs (stationary sunspot equilibria). For a strict subset of the parameter space there exist SSEs that are locally stable under least squares learning provided agents use a common factor representation for their estimated law of motion. These results ...

This paper extends the recent investigation of Tahvonen and Withagen (1996, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 20, 1775}1795) for costly and thus sluggish instead of instantaneous reductions in emissions. In addition to the social optimum, the paper investigates the competitive equilibrium. This plausible extension allows to derive limit cycles as the outcome for both, the social optimum ...

With the upcoming EU regulation on use of in-vitro diagnostic devices, a critical evaluation current status our in-house developed LC-MS/MS methods is timely and great relevance. Recently, much attention has been devoted to need for better specification analytical clinical performance. Appropriate reporting actual achieved performance an important determinant subsequent effectiveness test. We a...

We study forward-looking economic models assuming that agents take one step ahead expectations looking back k time periods. We show that the dynamics of the economy with such an expectation function are characterized by the coexistence of perfect foresight and nonperfect foresight cycles. The stability of all these periodic solutions under bounded rationality is related to the stability of the ...

Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. This paper gives a counter-example to the main step in Cotter’s [K. Cotter, Correlated equilibrium in games with typedependent strategies, J. Econ. Theory 54 (1991) 48–69] argument for correlated equilibrium...

This paper analyze Nash’s equilibrium (maximum utilility MU) and its relation with the order state (minimum entropy ME). I introduce the concept of minimum entropy as a paradigm of both Nash-Hayek’s equilibrium. The ME concept is related to Quantum Games. One question arises after completing this exercise: What do the Quantum Mechanics postulates indicate about Game Theory and Economics? Journa...

In this paper we extend the results of recent studies on the existence of equilibrium in finite dimensional asset markets for both bounded and unbounded economies. We do not assume that the individual’s preferences are complete or transitive. Our existence theorems for asset markets allow for short selling. We shall also show that the equilibrium achieves a constrained core within the same fram...

The purpose of this note is to demonstrate a sufficient condition for discrete tâtonnement process to lead to chaos in a general equilibrium model with multiple commodities. The result indicates that as the speed of price adjustment increases the discrete tâtonnement process is complex in a general equilibrium economy in which there are multiple equilibria. JEL classification: E32; C62 Keywards...