We study a dynamic game between a seller, a buyer (or "activist"), and a regulator. The seller decides whether to produce in a pro…t-maximizing or socially responsible way ("self-regulate"). The buyer, bene…tting from such self-regulation, decides whether to buy or not (i.e., initiate/end the "boycott"). The regulator can directly regulate production, although in a clumsy/costly way. The equili...

the seller must deliver the goods in conformity with the contract. one of cases of conformity is its conformity with the contract in terms of quantity. namely, the seller must deliver the goods that are equal with the specified amount in the contract. in practice, the delivered goods may be larger than the amount specified in the contract. in iranian law, where the goods are larger than contrac...

In this paper, we suggest using an English Auction Protocol for a procurement multi-attribute auction in which the item for sale is defined by several attributes, the buyer agent is the auctioneer, and the seller agents are the bidders. Such domains include auctions on task allocation, services, or compound products. At the beginning of the auction the buyer agent announces the required propert...

A price-setting seller faces a buyer with unknown reservation value. We show that if the buyer is sufficiently risk averse, the seller can benefit from employing a Possibly-Final Offer (PFO) strategy. In a PFO, if the buyer rejects the seller’s initial offer the seller sometimes terminates the interaction. If the seller does not terminate, he follows up with a subsequent, more attractive offer....

Supply chain is an accepted way of remaining in the competition in today's rapidly changing market. This paper presents a coordinated seller-buyer supply chain model in two stages, which is called Joint Economic Lot Sizing (JELS) in literature. The delivery activities in the supply chain consist of a single raw material. We assume that the delivery lead time is stochastic and follows an exponen...

A buyer facing two spatially-separated sellers can negotiate with only one potential seller at a time. However, with some delay, the buyer can move back and forth between the two sellers. The introduction of behavioral types, even with low probabilities, makes the equilibrium of the resulting multilateral bargaining problem essentially unique. The equilibrium has a war of attrition structure. T...

We consider a price discrimination problem in which a seller has a single object for sale to a potential buyer. At the time of contracting, the buyer’s private type is his incomplete private information about his value, and the seller can disclose additional private information to the buyer. We study the question of whether discriminatory information disclosure can be profitable to the seller u...

I analyze how a buyer optimally contracts with a seller who is privately informed about his information structure, i.e., his ability of acquiring private signals containing imperfect cost information. I demonstrate that the seller ranks information structures according to the order of their signal distributions in the sense of second order stochastic dominance. Optimal contracts offer sellers w...

We analyze the security of a fingerprinting scheme proposed at IWDW 2005. We show two results, namely that this scheme (1) does not provide seller security : a dishonest buyer can repudiate the fact that he redistributed a content, and (2) does not provide buyer security : a buyer can be framed by a malicious seller.