Bribery in Health Care in Peru and Uganda In this paper, I examine the role of household income in determining who bribes and how much they bribe in health care in Peru and Uganda. I find that rich patients are more likely than other patients to bribe in public health care: doubling household consumption increases the bribery probability by 0.2-0.4 percentage points in Peru, compared to a bribe...

This paper studies the dynamics of bribery that occurs between citizens and bureaucrats when the formers go to the laters in order to aquire a public service that requires an administrative procedure. The study is based in an agent-based model. Citizens adapt their bribes levels through social learning. Bureaucrats develop their decisions through both individual and social learning mechanisms. ...

This paper argues that self-reporting schemes whereby citizens report their noncompliance with regulation can prevent corruption in administrations. In our model, entrepreneurs must comply with regulation before undertaking a risky activity. O cials verify compliance before granting permits, and may engage in either bribery or extortion. Without a self-reporting scheme, the government tolerates...

We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when a client pays, and the payoffs to the client’s decision. We test this framework using a new data set on bribery of Peruvian public officials by households. The theory predicts that bribery is more attractive to both parties when the client is richer, and we find empirically that both bribery incidence...

Manipulation models for electoral systems are a core research theme in social choice theory; they include bribery (unweighted, weighted, swap, shift, . . . ), control (by adding or deleting voters or candidates), lobbying in referenda and others. We develop a unifying framework for manipulation models with few types of people, one of the most commonly studied scenarios. A critical insight of ou...

We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little ev...