Building on Genicot and Ray (2006) we develop a model on non-cooperative bargaining that combines the two main approaches in the literature of contracting with externalities: the o¤er game (in which the principal makes simultaneous o¤ers to the agents) and the bidding game (in which the agents make simultaneous o¤ers to the principal). Allowing for agent coordination, we show that the outcome o...

1his article examines the bargaining interface between petroleum-rich developing countries and large multinational corporations, with an application to the case of Kazakhstan, formerly a Soviet Republic. In the analytic narrative tradition, this ankle combines a case study with an extensive form game, applying Theodore Moran's dynamic bargaining theory, which posits that, over time and through ...

This paper reexamines the game-theoretic bargaining theory from logic and Artificial Intelligence perspectives. We present an axiomatic characterization of the logical solutions to bargaining problems. A bargaining situation is described in propositional logic with numerical representation of bargainers’ preferences. A solution to the n-person bargaining problems is proposed based on the maxmin...

This thesis applies evolutionary algorithms to tackle bargaining games. Evolutionary algorithms can discover efficient and stationary strategies for various bargaining games. Game-theoretic method requires a substantial amount of mathematical reasoning. Thus this method restricts to simple problems. Moreover, game-theoretic solutions rest on the crucial assumption that every player is perfectly...

This note investigates the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study subgame perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following results emerge from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of undominated pure-strategy Markov...

Within the class of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a game is characterized by the coincidence of its core and the steady bargaining set. As a consequence it is also proved that convexity can also be characterized by the coincidence of the core of a game and the modified Zhou bargaining set (Shimomura, 1997)

This paper extends the analogy previously established by Leamer (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem, to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with prefe...

We compare the bargaining power of the patentee under American and English rules of legal costs allocation. Using the Nash Bargaining Game framework, we show that litigation can be a Pareto efficient outcome. The cooperative game framework allows us to examine how the institutional and market factors influence bargaining powers of plaintiff and defendant under different rules of legal cost allo...

We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers to bridge a gap between non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory. Theoretical results include the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) and the characterization of the grand-coalition SSPE as a generalized Nash bargaining solution, provided that it lies in the core. We also prov...