This paper presents a sound BAN-like logic for reasoning about security protocols with theorem prover support. The logic has formulas for sending and receiving mes­ sages (with nonces, public and private encryptions etc.), and has both temporal and epistemic operators (describing the knowledge of participants). The logic’s semantics is based on strand spaces. Several (secrecy or authentication)...

The cryptographic protocol analysis logic of Gong, Needham and Yahalom (GNY) ooers signiicant advantages over its predecessor, the Burrows, Abadi and Needham (BAN) logic. Manual analysis of protocols using the GNY logic, however, is cumbersome , as the logic has a large set of inference rules. This paper proposes a modiied GNY logic, and describes the implementation of a protocol analysis tool ...

We describe what we believe was the rst use of formal methods to verify a bank payment system. This was an electronic purse for ooine small-to-medium value payments, and has since developed into the VISA COPAC product. We veriied it using a variant of the BAN logic.

We describe what we believe was the first use of formal methods to verify a bank payment system. This was an electronic purse for offline small-to-medium value payments, and has since developed into the VISA COPAC product. We verified it using a variant of the BAN logic.

The secure deployment of components is widely recognized as a crucial problem in component-based software engineering. While major effort is concentrated on preventing malicious components from penetrating secure systems, other security violations may also cause significant problems. We uncover a technique that creates a major breach of security by allowing rogue components to interfere with co...

This paper discusses a class of attacks against cryptographic protocols that have not been previously representable using BAN-style logics. This problem has resulted in the generation of proofs of these protocols that validate nal beliefs of the protocol participants even when successful attacks against these protocols have been demonstrated. The failings of the BAN-style proofs of these protoc...

Securely accessing unfamiliar services in public environments using ad hoc wireless networks is challenging. We present a proxy-based approach that uses other existing network channels to set up a secure and trust relationship between communication parties to facilitate ad hoc wireless communications. Based on a service discovery protocol, our models achieve secure, trusted, anonymous, efficien...