The purpose of the current study is to examine the degree of reliance external auditors are willing to place on the work of the internal audit function (IAF) when the IAF's objectivity might be compromised. Experienced external auditors (N = 142) participated in a 2 (reporting relationship: audit committee of the board of directors [ACBOD] or chief finance officer [CFO]) by 2 (IAF involvement i...

Automated control weaknesses are associated with defects in computer hardware or computer applications. AU 319 does not require auditors to add professionals with specialized skills in automated controls (or IT audit specialists) to the audit engagement. Auditors may encounter a material automated control weakness and adjust their audit plan without the assistance of an IT audit specialists. Th...

Audit-team specialists (valuation specialists employed by the audit firm) who evaluate a subset of the assumptions integral to a complex estimate often include caveats on otherwise-clean results to communicate reservations about certain assumptions to auditors. Although caveats can contain interpretation that may improve auditors’ judgments about estimates, auditors do not uniformly view caveat...

SYNOPSIS: Earnings management remains a popular topic of debate and discussion among investors, regulators, analysts, and the public. One mechanism that might mitigate earnings management is auditors’ industry expertise. Using a large sample of clients of Big 6 auditors, this research examines the association between auditor industry expertise, measured in terms of both auditor market share in ...

Information about the financial health of public companies provided by auditors ideally allows investors to make informed decisions and enhances the efficiency of financial markets. However, under the current system auditors are hired and fired by the companies they audit, which introduces incentives for biases that favor the audited companies. Three experiments demonstrate bias in auditors' ju...

.•\bstract—Theoretical research suggests that large auditors have more incentive to issue accurate reports compared to small auditors (DeAngelo. 1981; Dye, 1993). Controiling for the client characteristics of large and small auditors, this paper shows that large auditors issue reports that are more accurate and more informative signals of financial distress. These findings are consistent with t...

This study provides both survey and experimental evidence to consider how the interaction between staff-level auditors and client management may affect the auditors’ perceptions and influence their decisions regarding the collection of audit evidence. During fieldwork, staff-level auditors have extensive interaction with client management. Survey evidence suggests that these staff-level auditor...