This study examines whether personal liability for corporate malfeasance deters individuals from serving as independent directors. After the introduction of in India, we find that are deterred on boards. We stronger deterrence among firms with greater litigation and regulatory risk, higher monitoring costs, weak monetary incentives. Expert directors more likely to exit, resulting 1.16% lower fi...

We investigate whether corruption amplifies the political effects of economic crises. Using Spanish municipal-level data and a difference-in-difference strategy, we find that local unemployment shocks experienced during Great Recession (2008–2015) increased fragmentation. This effect was four times larger in municipalities exposed to malfeasance than without history corruption. bolster this evi...

As companies became larger and shareholders more numerous in nineteenth early twentieth-century Britain, the conventional wisdom is that free-rider problem inhibited active shareholder participation. Discontented could sell market, but it was long before takeover bid mechanism facilitated removal of underperforming incumbent boards. We show, using a sample fifty cases period from 1888 to 1940, ...

This article employs Social Movement Theory (SMT) to examine collective action mobilisation against malfeasance by Nigeria’s Special Anti-Robbery Squads (SARS). Created in the 1990s counter armed gangs, SARS gradually became discredited. Finally, October 2020, after weeks of public protest, unit was disbanded. The #EndSARS movement proved instrumental here. present explores origins, nature and ...