I analyze how a buyer optimally contracts with a seller who is privately informed about his information structure, i.e., his ability of acquiring private signals containing imperfect cost information. I demonstrate that the seller ranks information structures according to the order of their signal distributions in the sense of second order stochastic dominance. Optimal contracts offer sellers w...

هدف: هدف پژوهش برجسته کردن مفهوم رفتار انحرافی سازمانی از طریق بررسی مطالعات پیشین و درک پویایی این رفتارها ارائه تصویری جامع روند فراهم آوردن بینشی ارزشمند وضعیت رفتارهای در ایران کمک به هدایت پژوهش­‌های آتی راستای پوشش شکاف­‌های تحقیقاتی موجود حوزه است.روش: با استفاده روش فراترکیب، یافته­‌های پژوهش­های کیفی کمی مرتبط ترکیب الگوی نهایی طراحی شد. بر اساس، 90 سازمانی، اهداف مطالعه حاضر هفت مرحله...

We analyze the role of intermediaries on electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (person-to-person) lending platform. On such an electronic credit market lenders bid for supplying a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. We find that these participa...

The paper studies an incentive contract in a monopolistic and duopolistic credit market where borrowers are different in risk. One lender is in an advantaged position with respect to the other due to past relations with the borrowers. The features of the equilibrium contract are investigated. It is shown that the equilibrium contract drastically changes between the monopolistic and the duopolis...

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independent determination of each agent’s type (impatient or patient), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. For general preferences, we show, via a simple argume...

Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When bank payoffs are partially appropriable, either directly via imposition of fines or indirectly by the...

Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard, and can therefore increase lending and reduce default rates. To test these predictions, we construct a new international data set on private credit bureaus and public credit registers. We find that bank lending is higher and proxies for default rates are lower in countries where lenders share i...

We examine how asymmetric information and competition in the credit market affect voluntary information sharing between lenders. We study an experimental credit market in which information sharing can help lenders to distinguish good borrowers from bad ones, because borrowers may exogenously switch locations. Lenders, however, are also engaged in spatial competition, and lose market power by sh...