This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games.  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved...

This paper surveys the literature on group selection. I describe the early contributions and the group selection controversy. I also describe the main approaches to group selection in the recent literature; …xation, assortative group formation, and reproductive externalities. Keywords: Altruism; spite; externalities; conformity; …xation; signalling JEL Classi…cation: C70; D03; D62; D64

We derive a new cost of information in rational inattention problems, the neighborhood-based functions, starting from observation that many settings involve exogenous states with topological structure. These functions are uniformly posterior separable and capture notions perceptual distance. This second property ensures costs, unlike mutual information, make accurate predictions about behavior ...

Abstract This article provides an empirical case study of the impacts COVID-19 pandemic on global beverage markets, particularly wine sector. Both international trade and domestic sales have been adversely affected by temporary shifts away from on-premise social distancing measures self-isolation that led to closure restaurants, bars, clubs, plus declines in travel tourism. Partly offsetting th...

We show that one of the main results in Chen and Sönmez (2006, 2008) [6,7] does no longer hold when the number of recombinations is sufficiently increased to obtain reliable conclusions. No school choice mechanism is significantly superior in terms of efficiency. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C70; C13; C91

Collective choices are often cyclic and cannot be rationalized by a well-defined linear ordering. In this paper we identify conditions under which collective choices, potentially cyclic, can be rationalized by extensive games with perfect information. JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D70

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function. JEL Classification: C70, D11, D80

The concept of stability á la J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, which is composed of a pair of internal and external stability requirements, formalizes the idea of standard of behavior. This paper studies the decisiontheoretic foundation of stability, by establishing some epistemic conditions for a “stable” pattern of behavior in the context of strategic interaction. JEL Classification: C70, C...

This paper presents a procedure for studying industrial performance and related issues such as changes in the wage structure. This procedure combines cluster analysis and discriminant analysis as a package, and applies this package to time series data. This enables us to organize industrial data into groups with similar wage or performance histories and then to extract summary time-series showi...

We offer a detailed examination of a broad class of 2 × 2 matrix games as a first step toward considering measures of resource distribution and efficiency of outcomes. In the present essay, only noncooperative equilibria and entropic outcomes are considered, and a crude measure of efficiency employed. Other solution concepts and the formal construction of an efficiency index will be addressed i...