This paper proposes an economic dispatch strategy for the electricity system with one generation company, multiple utility companies and multiple consumers, which participate in demand response to keep the electricity real-time balance. In the wholesale markets, multiple utility companies will commonly select a reliable agent to negotiate with the generation company on the wholesale price. It i...

We develop a reduced-form model of price transmission in a vertical sector, allowing for refined asymmetric, contemporaneous and lagged, own and cross price effects under time-varying volatility. The model is used to investigate wholesale-retail price dynamics in the US butter market. The analysis documents the nature of nonlinear price dynamics in a vertical sector, with implications for price...

a r t i c l e i n f o JEL classification: D82 D83 Q49 L11 L12 L94 Keywords: Price pass-through Norwegian electricity market Price asymmetry Market power Transmission lag In this paper we estimate the pass-through of wholesale electricity price to the end consumer price with variable price contracts in the Norwegian electricity market using weekly data. We find substantial asymmetry when retaile...

W every firm in a supply chain bears supply risk (the cost of insufficient supply), some firms may, even with wholesale price contracts, completely avoid inventory risk (the cost of unsold inventory). With a push contract there is a single wholesale price and the retailer, by ordering his entire supply before the selling season, bears all of the supply chain’s inventory risk. A pull contract al...

We consider a supply chain with an upstream supplier who invests in innovation and a downstream manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study the impact of supply chain contracts with upstream innovation, focusing on three different contract scenarios: (i) a wholesale price contract, (ii) a quality-dependent wholesale price contract, and (iii) a revenue-sharing contract. We confirm that the rev...

This paper studies the impact of a manufacturer-hired sales agent on a supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer. The sales agent is working mainly at the retailer’s location in order to boost the demand. We focus on a wholesale price contract, under which the retailer decides how much to order from the manufacturer. The information structure within the supply chain and the efficien...

We consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer with private demand forecast information arising dynamically over an infinite time horizon. We show that the manufacturer’s optimal dynamic long-term contract takes a simple form: in the first period, based on her private demand forecast, the retailer selects a wholesale price and pays an associated upfront fee, and, from then on, the two parties...

We develop a reduced-form model of price transmission in a vertical sector, allowing for refined asymmetric, contemporaneous and lagged, own and cross price effects. The model is used to analyze wholesale-retail price dynamics in the US butter market. The analysis provides strong evidence of asymmetric price transmissions. It documents the complex nature of nonlinear price dynamics in a vertica...