We consider two populations co-evolving with fitness defined by the payoff in a two-person zero-sum game. We show that such situations lead to spontaneous and sustained oscillations iff the optimal strategy of the game is mixed.

We study existence of (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria (NE) in pure positional strategies in finite positional n-person games with perfect information and terminal payoffs. However, these games may have moves of chance and cycles. Yet, we assume that All Infinite Plays Form One Outcome a∞, in addition to the set of Terminal outcomes VT . This assumption will be called the AIPFOOT condition. Fo...

The solution is given here for the infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum,games of inr complete information characterized by 2 X 2 games, with information matrxces b for the ftrst game and( b ab)for the second game.

We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold’em poker). Our algorithm only performs basic iterations (i.e matvec multiplications, clipping, etc., and no calls to external first-order oracles, no matrix inversions, etc.) and is applicable to a broad class...

Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of ‘‘hide and seek’’. Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player’s role in the game; an asymmetry across the game variations; and positive serial correlation in subjects’ play. Possible explanations for these depar...

The classical matrix theory is deficient to express the vagueness of the real life. The fuzzy set theory has been successfully applied to bridge this gap. Much work has already been done on a two-person zero sum matrix game with fuzzy goals. In continuation, this paper is dedicated to define and study a multi-criteria two-person zero sum game with intuitionistic fuzzy goals. It is shown that so...

A joint derivation of utility and value for two-person zero-sum games is obtained using a decision theoretic approach. Acts map states to consequences. The latter are lotteries over prizes, and the set of states is a product of two finite sets (m rows and n columns). Preferences over acts are complete, transitive, continuous, monotonic and certainty-independent (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989», an...