We provide a new model that generates persistent performance differences amongst seemingly similar enterprises. Our model provides a mechanism whereby efficient incumbent rivals can give permission for an inefficient firm to exist in the presence of efficient entrants. We demonstrate that, in a repeated game, an efficient incumbent has a unilateral incentive to establish a relational contract t...

We report an experiment designed to study whether inefficient firms are systematically driven from overcrowded markets. Our data set includes a series of 3,800 wars of attrition of a type modeled by Fudenberg and Tirole in 1986. We find that exit tends to be efficient and exit times conform surprisingly well to point predictions of the model. Moreover, subjects respond similarly to implementati...

This paper studies the optimal division of profit with complementary innovations. We identify circumstances in which the research should be conducted sequentially, targeting one innovation after another in a prespecified order, even if each innovation can be achieved independently of the others. We then consider the implementation of this sequential pattern of investment in a market equilibrium...

Action research isapowerful tool thatcan beused byteaching centers to improve teaching and learning. This chapter describes an action research project conducted at theCenter forResearch on Learning and Teaching at the University of Michigan. The projectconcerns retention and attrition in science gateway courses, with particular attention given to therole of the teaching assistant. This chapter ...

This study analyses the characteristics of members leaving trade unions in Spain – specifically the Catalonia branch of Workers’ Commissions (CCOO-Catalonia) – alongside their reasons for leaving using a variety of data sources. Our findings indicate higher union attrition among members in more precarious employment situations (i.e. temporary employment, low seniority). In general, union leaver...