Cooperative advertising is an agreement between a manufacturer and a retailer to share advertising cost at the local level. Previous studies have not investigated cooperative advertising for complementary products and their main focus was only on one good. In this paper, we study a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer with two complementary goods. The demand ...

Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory. The first part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all games are created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static) or (stationary/non-stationary) or (sequential/one-shot) non-cooperative games, and importantly, whether or not they are intended to represent a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, the...

This paper considers advertising, collection and pricing decisions simultaneously for a closed-loop supplychain(CLSC) with one manufacturer(he) and two retailers(she). A multiplicatively separable new demand function is proposed which influenced by pricing and advertising. In this paper, three well-known scenarios in the game theory including the Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative games are expl...

This study considers pricing, production and transportation decisions in a Stackelberg game between three-stage, multi-product, multi-source and single-period supply chains called leader and follower. These chains consist of; manufacturers, distribution centers (DCs) and retailers. Competition type is horizontal and SC vs. SC. The retailers in two chains try to maximize their profit through pri...

This paper studies a class of dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop information structure with constrained linear agent dynamics and quadratic utility functions. We show two important properties for this class of dynamic Stackelberg games. First, we prove that under mild conditions, the optimal control of individual agents at the solution of the Stackelberg game coincides with the solution ...

This paper studies equilibrium incentives in a vertically differentiated duopoly with price competition. We analyze one simultaneous-move game and two sequential-move games. In a simultaneous-move game, firms' managers determine their prices simultaneously in the first stage of the game and in the second stage two firms determine incentive schemes. One sequential-move game considers the case in...

We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic. This can be modeled as an extensive-form game of perfect information, which we call a Stackelberg voting game. We first propose a dynamic-programming algorithm for finding the backward-induction outcome for any Stackelberg vot...

It is now widely accepted that in many situations where classifiers are deployed, adversaries deliberately manipulate data in order to reduce the classifier’s accuracy. The most prominent example is email spam, where spammers routinely modify emails to get past classifier-based spam filters. In this paper we begin by modeling the interaction between the adversary and the data miner as a finite ...

The equilibrium network signal control problem is represented as a Stackelberg game. Due to the characteristics of a Stackelberg game, solving the upper-level problem and lower-level problem iteratively cannot be expected to converge to the solution. The reaction function of the lower-level problem is the key information to solve a Stackelberg game. Usually, the reaction function is approximate...

This paper focuses on the single-issue negotiation between Manufacture Agent (MA) and Material Supplier Agent (MSA) of the supply chain. MSA resorts to find partners to cooperate when it cannot finish the order independently. A two stage negotiation protocol is proposed. The cooperative game is combined with MA-Stackelberg game to resolve the negotiation problem. It is used to establish the coa...