We formulate and study the requirement on an allocation rule that no agent should be able to benefit by augmenting his endowment through borrowing resources from the outside world (alternatively, by simply exaggerating it). We show that the Walrasian rule is not “borrowing-proof” even on standard domains. More seriously, no efficient selection from the endowments-lower-bound correspondence, or ...

I introduce a concept of D(k)-proofness which says that a rule is nonmanipulable by the false preference relations within k distance from the sincere one. I prove that for every rule defined over all weak orders, strategyproofness is equivalent to D(k)-proofness if and only if k ≥ m − 1, where m is the number of the alternatives.

We present some results on social welfare function and social choice function. First, we replace weak Pareto principle of Arrow’s axioms with strong Pareto principle, and then show that assuming unrestricted domain property, independence of irrelevant alternatives and strong Pareto principle on a social welfare function in Arrow’s sense leads to the existence of first to nth commanders whose st...

We study the problem of allocating objects by means of probabilistic mechanisms. Each agent has strict preferences over objects and ex post receives exactly one object. A standard approach in the literature is to extend agents' preferences over objects to preferences over lotteries de ned on those objects, using the rst-order stochastic dominance criterion, or the sd-extension. In a departure f...

ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for

The lemmas in Appendix C.2 show how requirements R1–R6 are driven by group strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency. The following examples further illustrate the role of the consistency requirements R4–R6. Requirement R4 is needed to ensure the individual strategy-proofness of the TC mechanisms. This requirement is also needed to ensure the individual strategyproofness of the TTC mechanisms, a...

It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some ...

A set of agents with different waiting costs have to receive a service of equal length of time from a single provider which can serve only one agent at a time. One needs to form a queue and set up monetary transfers to compensate the agents who have to wait. We analyze rules that are efficient, fair, and immune to strategic behavior. We prove that no rule is Pareto-efficient and coalitional str...