Dr. Jonathan B. Tucker directs the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. Prior to this appointment, he worked on chemical and biological weapons issues at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and on the staff of the Presidential ...

Nuclear weapon states historically have attached great secrecy to their nuclear weapon and fissile material production programs and stockpiles, despite warnings that this would fuel fears, handicap informed debate and decision making, and drive arms races. As evidenced by the “Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament” agreed upon at the 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Re...

The global nuclear order had been challenged in recent years by individual proliferators, the moribund US–Russian arms-control process and resultant frustration over stalled progress towards disarmament. Then Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine under cover threats against NATO. This has neither exposed international nuclear-governance regime as toothless nor brought it to verge c...

Commentators differ on whether nuclear disarmament would be desirable, but many argue that disarmament is impractical because it could not be verified. Three reasons are often offered for such pessimism. First, nuclear weapons are small and difficult to detect, and one could not be sure that a few weapons had not been hidden away. Second, nuclear weapons are so destructive that a mere handful w...

The author offers a close analysis of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the treaty’s only article dealing with disarmament, focusing upon both its text and negotiating history, and assesses its applicability as a standard for judging treaty compliance. The author critiques comments on Article VI made by the International Court of Justice in a 1996 case ...

While often recognised as a difficult actor in global efforts addressing the proliferation, control, and disarmament of nuclear weapons, EU is also assumed to have potential play more cohesive “state-like” role, especially multilateral forum such Treaty on Non-Proliferation Nuclear Weapons review cycle. Such assumptions raise expectations external action influence, which then invariably fails m...

despite being the member of the international disarmament and non-proliferation conventions i.e. non-proliferation treaty (npt), chemical weapons convention (cwc) and biological weapons convention (bwc) which include their own specific export control regimes, some developed countries established parallel export control regimes that are against their commitments under aforementioned internationa...