This paper studies the effect of product market competition on the explicit compensation packages that firms offer to their CEOs, executives and workers. We use a large sample of both traded and non-traded UK firms and exploit a quasi-natural experiment associated to an increase in competition. The sudden appreciation of the pound in 1996 implied different changes in competition for sectors wit...

Using the ExecuComp data set, which contains information on the five highest-paid executives in each of a large number of U.S. firms for the years 1992–97, the authors examine the gender compensation gap among high-level executives. Women, who represented about 2.5% of the sample, earned about 45% less than men. As much as 75% of this gap can be explained by the fact that women managed smaller ...

This paper studies the impacts of incentive compensation to top five executives on employee wages. We employ pay-performance sensitivity measure executive compensation. Using sample during 1992 – 2017, we find that has negative In addition, examine wages in different industries and are more severe technology firms than non-technology firms. Finally, show with higher likely suppress financially ...

Purpose This paper aims to contribute the discussion on executives’ team and firm performance by investigating relationships between compensation, management gender diversity financial in growth enterprises market (GEM) listed firms China. Design/methodology/approach Data are collected from 461 companies GEM boards during period year 2016 2018. Specifically, compensation female executives set a...

Title of Dissertation: HUMAN CAPITAL, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: HOW DOES THE SLICE OF PIE EXECUTIVES APPROPRIATE COMPARE TO WHAT THEY BRING TO THE TABLE? Dante D. Di Gregorio, Ph.D., 2004 Dissertation Directed By: Professor Ken G. Smith & Associate Professor Cynthia K. Stevens, Department of Management & Organization, Robert H. Smith School of Business Prior research has ident...

We study the effect of a firm's acquisitions on the subsequent career of its chief executive officer (CEO) by examining a sample of executives who undertook large acquisitions between 1986 and 1988. We find that acquirers do not have significantly different compensation growth from executives who did not undertake acquisitions. Further, we find the effect of acquisitions on compensation does no...

We link the corporate governance literature in financial economics to the agency cost perspective of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to derive theoretical predictions about the relationship between corporate governance and the existence of executive compensation incentives for CSR. We test our predictions using novel executive compensation contract data, and find that firms with more shar...

We investigate the impact of stock-based compensation on managerial ownership. We find that equity compensation succeeds in increasing incentives of lowerownership managers, but higher-ownership managers negate much of its impact by selling previously owned shares. When executives exercise options to acquire stock, nearly all of the shares are sold. Our results illuminate dynamic aspects of man...

Agency theory suggests that the interests of opportunistic, self-interested agents conflict with those of principals. Stewardship theory suggests instead that executives’ interests are aligned with company interests and that executives are thus more intrinsically motivated than agency theory implies. This study develops hypotheses regarding the psychological and situational factors that affect ...