We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have reservation utilities, stemming from outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence envy, but this can be incompatible with utilities. It possible that Alice's envy Bob's assignment cannot remedied without violating participation constraint. Instead, we seek to rule out...

We discuss the existence of matrix representations for generalised and minimum participation constraints which are frequently used in database design and conceptual modelling. Matrix representations, also known as Armstrong relations, have been studied in literature e.g. for functional dependencies and play an important role in example-based design and for the implication problem of database co...

This paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter's reservation utility depends on his type. The informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade. The paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating, to be nonstochastic, and to induce full partic...

This paper examines an informed principal-agent game with ex post participation constraints for the agent. It shows that the players do not loss by communicating in turn among themselves rather than simultaneously if and only if the principal communicates first. It then considers any Bayesian allocation rule implemented in this bilateral asymmetric information framework. It provides necessary a...

Traditional database systems have been successful in handling large amounts of data but lack mechanisms for schema derivations and schema veri cation In this paper we propose i structures that carry expressive and useful information on the database schema ii a set of inference rules for schema derivations and iii a mechanism for discovering contradictory schema declarations To this end in addit...

In a simple model, we show that a joint venture can implement the rates of investment that maximize joint profit when firms’ research abilities are private information. This can be done with budget balance, even though there are participation constraints. There is no conflict between budget balance and participation constraints because firms’ payoffs can depend on ex post signals of abilities. ...

The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if ...