This paper presents an application of interval methods for simulation of a policy game played by four main agents of economy: profit maximizing companies active on competitive market, the monopolistic trade union (aggregated wage setters), the government and the central bank. After reduction of companies as an active agent, the resulting three agents decision system is modeled as a Stackelberg ...

This paper considers advertising, collection and pricing decisions simultaneously for a closed-loop supplychain(CLSC) with one manufacturer(he) and two retailers(she). A multiplicatively separable new demand function is proposed which influenced by pricing and advertising. In this paper, three well-known scenarios in the game theory including the Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative games are expl...

Abstract-In this paper, correspondences are drawn between two game theory models (Nash noncooperative and Stackelberg games) and some problems in transportation systems modelling. An example of each is described in detail, namely the problem of carriers competing for intercity passenger travel and the signal optimization problem. The discussion serves to underline differences between two catego...

Traditional classification methods assume that the training and the test data arise from the same underlying distribution. However in some adversarial settings, the test set can be deliberately constructed in order to increase the error rates of a classifier. A prominent example is email spam where words are transformed to avoid word-based features embedded in a spam filter. Recent research has...

Simultaneous (Nash) and sequential (Stackelberg) equilibria of two-player dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under a perfect Bayesian formulation. For the dynamic scalar cheap talk, a zero-delay communication setup is considered for i.i.d. and Markov sources; it is shown that the final stage equilibrium is always quantized and under further restrictive con...

We address the problem of spectrum sharing where competitive operators coexist in the same frequency band. First, we model this problem as a strategic non-cooperative game where operators simultaneously share the spectrum according to the Nash Equilibrium (NE). Given a set of channel realizations, several Nash equilibria exist which renders the outcome of the game unpredictable. Then, in a cogn...

It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the original representation of the game), or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and ind...

We consider autonomous racing of two cars and present an approach to formulate the decision making as a non-cooperative non-zero-sum game. The game is formulated by restricting both players to fulfill static track constraints as well as collision constraints which depend on the combined actions of the two players. At the same time the players try to maximize their own progress. In the case wher...

This study considers pricing, production and transportation decisions in a Stackelberg game between three-stage, multi-product, multi-source and single-period supply chains called leader and follower. These chains consist of; manufacturers, distribution centers (DCs) and retailers. Competition type is horizontal and SC vs. SC. The retailers in two chains try to maximize their profit through pri...

We study a non-cooperative game with aggregative structure, namely when the payoffs depend on the strategies of the opponent players through an aggregator function. We assume that a subset of players behave as leaders in a Stackelberg model. The leaders, as well the followers, act non-cooperatively between themselves and solve a Nash equilibrium problem. We assume an exogenous uncertainty affec...