Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocations obtained by any continuous sharing rule contains Pareto e‰cient allocations. We also present a mechanis...

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent’s payo¤s. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent’s actions or payo¤s. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any …nite two-person game. Keywor...

In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players’ shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper, we consider contests with two players and investigate the relationship between these equilibrium share...

We consider scenarios where distributed agents are imperfect and occasionally adopt incorrect actions by mistake. Our goal is to design a distributed learning rule that allows the agents to seek resilient pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNEs) that can tolerate deviations potentially by multiple agents. We propose a new learning rule with a tunable parameter for pursuing resilient PSNEs, called ...

We survey the literature devoted to the study of the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked. We formulate a number of normative and strategic requirements on rules, and study their implications when imposed in various combinations. A unique rule emerges as being the best-behaved from a variety of viewpoints: the uniform rule. Key...

This study reports the effects of rebate rules on voluntary contributions to a threshold public good. Rebate rules specify how excess contributions, over the threshold amount are distributed. We examine three rebate rules experimentally: a no rebate policy where excess contributions are discarded, a proportional rebate policy where excess contributions are rebated proportionally to an individua...

We propose strike mechanisms as a solution to the classical problem of Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1978) Maskin (1999) according which, in two-person societies, no Pareto efficient rule is Nash-implementable. A mechanism specifies number alternatives that each player vetoes. Each simultaneously casts these vetoes selects randomly one alternative among non-vetoed ones. For strict preferences over un...

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each seller competes for a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. We call this game a catalog game. Our main objective is to show that catalog games have Nash equilibria. The Nash existence problem for catalog games is particularly contentious due to pa...

We study the use of auction algorithm in allocating a wireless fading channel among a set of non-cooperating users in both downlink and uplink communication scenarios. For the downlink case, we develop a novel auction-based algorithm to allow users to fairly compete for a wireless fading channel. We use the all-pay auction mechanism whereby user bid for the channel, during each time-slot, based...

This paper investigates the refinements of Nash equilibrium in two person signaling game experiments. The experimental games cover the watershed of the nested refinements: Bayes-Nash, Sequential, Intutitive, Divine, Universally Divine, NWBR, and Stabel. In each game an equilbrium selection problem is defined in which adjacent refinements are considered. The pattern of outcomes suggest that indi...