Much work in philosophy is concerned with logical reasoning, and much else with mysterious metaphysical things which might make you agree with Sir Isaiah Berlin, who once said "Philosophers are adults who persist in asking childish questions'".1 Unsurprisingly, there are those who think that asking a moral philosopher to deal with practical ethical questions is rather like asking a psychoanalys...

DeGrazia argues that post-persons have as much justification in believing that they have higher moral status than persons as persons have in believing that they have higher moral status than animals. DeGrazia's claim presupposes that what Buchanan calls the "moral equality assumption" is false. This article argues that DeGrazia has given us no reason to disbelieve the moral equality assumption....

The Rawlsian model of public justification is proposed for the assessment of politics of moral enhancement, in alternative to the neo-republican model proposed in these debates by Robert Sparrow. The central idea of the Rawlsian model of public justification is represented by the liberal principle of legitimacy, although it is extended in relation to the domain that Rawls sees as proper for its...

This note is a rejoinder to comments by Dubois and Moral about my paper “Likelihood-based belief function: justification and some extensions to low-quality data” published in this issue. The main comments concern (1) the axiomatic justification for defining a consonant belief function in the parameter space from the likelihood function and (2) the Bayesian treatment of statistical inference fro...

The question raised in this paper is whether legal rights to vote are also moral rights to vote. The challenge to the justification of a moral right to vote is that it is not clear that the vote is instrumental to the preservation of some critical interest of the voter. Because a single vote has ‘no impact’ on electoral outcomes, the right to vote is unlikely to serve the interests of the indiv...