We compare coordination success of individuals and teams in the minimum effort coordination game. The game is played by groups of either five individuals or five two-person teams with either fixed or random re-matching protocols. When groups are fixed, teams perform at least as well as individuals, if not better, in terms of coordinating to the payoff dominant outcome. But with random re-matchi...

Article history: Received 14 September 2010 Available online 22 August 2013 JEL classification: D86

Group key exchange protocols (GKE) allow a set of parties to establish a common key over an insecure network. So far the research on GKE mainly focused on identifying and formalizing appropriate security definitions that has led to a variety of different security models. Besides reaching a high security level, another important aspect is to reduce the communication effort. In many practical sce...

This paper revisits the minimum-effort coordination game with a continuum of Paretoranked Nash equilibria. Noise is introduced via a logit probabilistic choice function. The resulting logit equilibrium distribution of decisions is unique and maximizes a stochastic potential function. In the limit as the noise vanishes, the distribution converges to an outcome that is analogous to the risk-domin...

We focus on the effects of changing costs of effort in the minimum-effort coordination game. We find three main results. First, as the cost of effort increases, the level of effort decreases. Second, as the cost of effort increases, the convergence speed to an equilibrium also increases. Third, the overall efficiency (average payoff) does not monotonically decrease as the cost of effort increas...

To improve the autonomous flight capability of endo-atmospheric vehicles, such as cruise missiles, drones, and other small, low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), a novel minimum-effort waypoint-following differential geometric guidance law (MEWFDGGL) is proposed in this paper. Using classical geometry curve theory, optimal problem transformed into an space design problem, where command curv...

We consider data from an experiment on the minimum-effort game, repeated over many periods. In each play of player's belief about other players in group is elicited, addition to chosen effort level. find that agents choose levels systematically exceeding their beliefs others' levels. explain this terms such subjects taking role “leader” attempt pull towards more efficient outcomes. propensity f...