We discuss to which extent the median voter theorem extends to the domain of single-peaked preferences on median spaces. After observing that on this domain a Condorcet winner need not exist, we show that if a Condorcet winner does exist, then it coincides with the median alternative (“the median voter”). Based on this result, we propose two non-cooperative games that implement the unique strat...

This paper attempts to explain cross-national voting behavior in 18 Western democracies over 1960-2003. A new data set for the median voter is introduced that corrects for stochastic error in the statistics from the Comparative Manifesto Project. Next, the paper finds that electoral behavior is closely related to the salience of particular economic institutions. Labour organization, skill speci...

This paper documents the impact of voter turnout on top marginal tax rates in the 34 OECD countries for the period between 1974 and 2014. Across a number of specifications, I find that increases in voter turnout have a positive and statistically significant effect on top tax rates. This finding is broadly consistent with the median voter theorem that posits government redistribution to be a fun...

This paper presents a model in which voters attempt to balance the ideological positions of their Senate representatives. Candidate positions are determined endogenously through a primary system. The median voter theorem is applied in each election to determine winning platforms based on voter preferences which may differ from their individual bliss points. Contrary to the original median voter...

The paper defines and analyzes May’s Theorem the Median Voter from Public Policy Choice literature seeks to compare contrast use of both. Through theoretical applied examples, demonstrates how collective decision-making research has evolved better inform public policy. Building on Black’s (1948) notion that it is voter in ideological middle decides elections, Holcombe (1980) provides an empiric...

A one-dimensional spatial model of electoral competition with regional parties is considered, where parties only want to win constituencies. With no regional parties and only two national parties, the median voter theorem holds. But when we consider one national party and one regional party for each of the two regions, then the median voter theorem breaks down. Equilibrium is characterized unde...

The phenomena of divided senate delegations, whereby several states are represented by senators from opposing political parties and differing political ideology, may at first blush seem at odds with the traditional median voter model. In a recent paper (Heckelman, 2000), I have modified the median voter framework by introducing two key institutional aspects, primary elections and staggered term...

The election of extreme political leaders is often associated with changes in political institutions. This paper studies these phenomena through a model in which the median voter elects a leader anticipating that he will impose institutional constraints— such as constitutional amendments, judicial appointments, or the implicit threat of a coup— that in‡uence the behavior of future political cha...

....................................................................ii List of Tables.............................................................. v List of Figures............................................................ vi Acknowledgements..........................................................vii 1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION............................................... 1 2. CHAPTER T...