In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver 2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. In the course of those discussions it became clear that a likely …rst step will be to implement pairwise exchanges, bet...

Although a pilot national live-donor kidney exchange program was recently launched in the US, the kidney shortage is increasing faster than ever. A new solution paradigm is able to incorporate compatible pairs in exchange. In this paper, we consider an exchange framework that has both compatible and incompatible pairs, and patients are indifferent over compatible pairs. Only two-way exchanges a...

A kidney exchange is a centrally-administered barter market where patients swap their willing yet incompatible donors. Modern kidney exchanges use 2-cycles, 3-cycles, and chains initiated by non-directed donors (altruists who are willing to give a kidney to anyone) as the means for swapping. We propose significant generalizations to kidney exchange. We allow more than one donor to donate in exc...

This paper investigates implications of introducing immunosuppressants (or suppressants) in kidney exchange problems. We begin with the standard kidney exchange model without suppressants and define two versions of the top-trading cycles (TTC) solutions satisfying Pareto efficiency. We then extend the model by introducing suppressants that make a patient compatible with any donor by relaxing im...

In their recent paper, Roth et al. [Pairwise kidney exchange, J. Econ. Theory 125 (2005) 151–188] consider pairwise kidney exchanges, and show within this subset of feasible exchanges that a priority mechanism is strategy-proof. We show that this result can be broadened to allow much more general mechanisms and restrictions on the feasible set of allocations, including allowing three-way exchan...

conclusions by controlling the modifiable risk factors and modality of treatment in our study, physicians can reach more effective treatment. results at the end of the study, long-term graft failure was seen in 27 (10.2%) cases. one-year and 2-year graft survival after diagnosis of cancer were 93.6% and 91.7%, respectively. the univariate analysis showed that the incidence of chronic graft loss...

Fielded kidney exchanges typically use utilitarian or near-utilitarian matching rules, potentially at great cost to certain classes of hardto-match patients. Dickerson, Procaccia, and Sandholm [6] recently adapted the price of fairness, a measure of the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency, to kidney exchange; they showed that the price of fairness is small in theory but often non-negligibl...

Kidney exchange, where candidates with inoperable organ failure trade incompatible but willing donors, is a life-saving alternative to the deceased donor waitlist, which has inadequate supply to meet demand. Computer scientists and economists study this problem because it represents an opportunity to field a real barter exchange that improves sustainability of life and creates significant socie...