Key distribution and management is the foundation of any secure services of wireless sensor networks. Due to the resource constraints, establishing cryptographic keys between communicating sensors in large-scale wireless sensor networks is a big challenge. Traditional asymmetric key cryptography is not suitable for wireless sensor environment because of its complexity. Based on the polynomial-k...

Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) consists of huge number of sensor nodes which are small and inexpensive with very limited resources. The public key cryptography is undesirable to be used in WSN because of the limitations of the resources. A key management and predistribution techniques are required to apply the symmetric key cryptography in such a big network. Many key predistribution techniques ...

Remote user authentication based on passwords over untrusted networks is the conventional method of authentication in the Internet and mobile communication environment. Typical secure remote user access solutions rely on pre-established secure cryptographic keys, publickey infrastructure, or secure hardware. In this paper, we present secure password-based protocols for remote user authenticatio...

When a group key exchange protocol is executed, the session key is typically extracted from two types of secrets; long-term keys (for authentication) and freshly generated (often random) values. The leakage of this latter so-called ephemeral keys has been extensively analyzed in the 2-party case, yet very few works are concerned with it in the group setting. We provide a generic group key excha...

There has been many hidden communication techniques proposed in the last few years. The focus was given to steganography to build such techniques. Utilizing stego-key(s) to hide secret messages into images strengthen the security of these techniques. However, adopting one of the available keyagreement protocols, to distribute stego-key(s) between the communicating parties, will destroy the infr...

A new formal security model for session key exchange protocols in the public key setting is proposed, and several eecient protocols are analyzed in this model. The relationship between this new model and previously proposed models is explored, and several interesting, subtle distinctions between static and adaptive adversaries are explored. We also give a brief account of anonymous users.

The aim of this technical report is to complement the work in [To et al. 2014] by proposing a Group Key Exchange protocol so that the Querier and TDSs (and TDSs themselves) can securely create and exchange the shared key. Then, the security of this protocol is formally proved using the game-based model. Finally, we perform the comparison between this protocol and other related works.

In this work, we introduce an active attack on a Group Key Exchange protocol by Burmester and Desmedt. The attacker obtains a copy of the shared key, which is created in a collaborative manner with the legal users in a communication group.

Several group key protocols have been presented in the literature to enable secrecy of communication among dynamic groups of participants. However, there is a lack of consistency in the literature in terms of operations supported and performance metrics of the various protocols. This makes it difficult for designers to choose the best protocol for their specific applications. To alleviate this ...