This paper applies a virtue epistemology approach to using the Internet, as to improve our information-seeking behaviours. Virtue epistemology focusses on the cognitive character of agents and is less concerned with the nature of truth and epistemic justification as compared to traditional analytic epistemology. Due to this focus on cognitive character and agency, it is a fruitful but underexpl...

Virtue-theoretic or “aretaic” theories analyse knowledge in terms of intellectual abilities, virtues, faculties etc. possessed by the epistemic subject (rather than the other way around).1 Recent theories of this variety are persuasively advertised as marking a distinct advance in our quest to understanding what knowledge amounts to. In particular, Greco (2010, 2009) and Sosa (2009, 2007) make ...

In face of unethical incidents that threaten the world science, a question necessity and possible shape intellectual ethics has been raised. The article argues advantages virtue epistemology make it more attractive than other models (deontology, in particular). To purpose, reviews alternative for ethics, analyses criticises deontological approach demonstrates virtues approach. As problems with ...

In Defence of Virtue Epistemology Christoph Kelp Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy University of Leuven christoph.kelp [at] hiw.kuleuven.be Abstract. In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology's central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability— is n...

Ernest Sosa has long defended bi-level virtue epistemology on the grounds that it offers the best overall treatment of epistemology’s central issues. A surprising number of problems “yield to” the approach (Sosa 1991: 9). Sosa applies bi-level virtue epistemology to diagnose and bypass ongoing disputes in contemporary epistemology, including the disputes between foundationalists and coherentist...

Open-mindedness is generally regarded as an intellectual virtue because its exercise reliably leads to truth. However, some theorists have argued that openmindedness’s truth-conduciveness is highly contingent, pointing out that it is either not truth-conducive at all under certain scenarios or no better than dogmatism or credulity in others. Given such shaky ties to truth, it would appear that ...

Discussing the notion of “epistemic emotions” as proposed by Morton (2010), and his argument for which intellectual virtues will be “hard to attain” without those emotions, I introduce the thesis for which epistemic emotions constitute one of the building blocks of intellectual virtues, in order to provide an explanation of the cognitive process that binds the two. Epistemic emotions are buildi...