When attempting to draw a ball of a specified color either from an urn containing 50 red balls and 50 black balls or from an urn containing an unknown ratio of 100 red and black balls, a majority of decision makers prefer the known-risk urn, and this ambiguity aversion effect violates expected utility theory. In an experimental investigation of the effect of urn size on ambiguity aversion, 149 ...

This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of preferences which allow ambiguity aversion. It is assumed that decision makers treat risky lotteries and ambiguous lotteries separately, with preferences governed by the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms for risk and a variant of the Savage axioms for ambiguity. These axioms imply that the decision maker chooses among risks according to expected...

The phenomenon of ambiguity aversion, in which risky gambles with known probabilities are preferred over ambiguous gambles with unknown probabilities, has been thoroughly documented in adults but never measured in children. Here, we use two distinct tasks to investigate ambiguity preferences of children (8- to 9-year-olds) and a comparison group of adults (19- to 27-year-olds). Across three sep...

Gender Differences in Risk Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion This paper demonstrates gender differences in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. It also contributes to a growing literature relating economic preference parameters to psychological measures by asking whether variations in preference parameters among persons, and in particular across genders, can be accounted for by differences in pe...

We conduct a two-phase laboratory experiment, separated by several weeks. In the first phase, we conduct urn games intended to measure ambiguity aversion on a representative population of undergraduate students. In the second phase, we invite the students back with four different solicitation treatments, varying in the ambiguity of information regarding the task and the payout of the laboratory...

T paper finds preference reversals in measurements of ambiguity aversion, even if psychological and informational circumstances are kept constant. The reversals are of a fundamentally different nature than the reversals found before because they cannot be explained by context-dependent weightings of attributes. We offer an explanation based on Sugden’s random-reference theory, with different el...

OBJECTIVES Limited information is available on physician-related factors influencing therapeutic inertia (TI) in multiple sclerosis (MS). Our aim was to evaluate whether physicians' risk preferences are associated with TI in MS care, by applying concepts from behavioral economics. DESIGN In this cross-sectional study, participants answered questions regarding the management of 20 MS case scen...

This article presents the results of a survey designed to test, with economically sophisticated participants, Ellsberg’s ambiguity aversion hypothesis, and Smithson’s conflict aversion hypothesis. Based on an original sample of 78 professional actuaries (all members of the French Institute of Actuaries), this article provides empirical evidence that ambiguity (i.e. uncertainty about the probabi...