I develop here a fuller version of the model of smuggling displacement from Section 2 of the paper "Can Enforcement Backfire? Crime Displacement in the Context of Customs Reform in the Philippines." I assume a general form for the convex cost of smuggling, and account for the endogeneity of the volume imported by each firm. The basic conclusion–that a targeted increase in enforcement can raise ...

This paper deals with a smuggling game with multiple stages. Customs is allowed to patrol within the limited number of chances and obtain reward by the capture of a smuggler. The smuggler gets a reward depending on the amount of contraband he succeeds to ship in smuggling at each stage. The pay-off of the game is zero-sum. In almost all past studies, they adopt the alternative of smuggling or n...

The Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets: Evidence from Migrant Smuggling along the Southwestern Border This paper analyzes how enforcement along the U.S.-Mexican border has affected the market for migrant smugglers. Using a unique dataset that links border crossing histories from illegal Mexican migrants to aggregate enforcement and punishment statistics, we find that the effect of enforc...

This paper deals with a smuggling game with multiple stages, in which Customs and a smuggler participate. Customs and the smuggler are allowed to take an action of patrol and smuggling, respectively, within the limited number of chances. Customs obtains reward by the capture of the smuggler and the smuggler gets reward by the success of smuggling. The reward or the payoff of the game is brought...

OBJECTIVES To describe and analyse the cigarette smuggling trade in Belgium and its role in the international cigarette black market. DESIGN Analysis of Belgian customs and prosecution files concerning the cigarette smuggling trade in the period 2000 to 2006 and interviews with law enforcement authorities and private tobacco industry. RESULTS Analyses were made of the geographical aspects, ...

We examine how market structure and enforcement affect smuggling and welfare in a model where smuggling is camouflaged by legal sales. Conditions are given for when some, but not necessarily all, firms smuggle. With camouflaging, t e market price is below the price when all sales are legal, so smuggling improves wel if the price effect outweighs excess smuggling cost. This welfare effect is dir...

SMUGGLING is pervasive in Africa. Perhaps the most pronounced version of this is the development of ‘entrepôt states’ in West Africa, notably Benin, Togo and The Gambia (Igué and Soulé, 1992), whose economic development strategies have been largely based on enhancing their attractiveness as trading hubs. These countries serve as conduits for both legal transit to landlocked countries in West Af...