We study choice over prescription insurance plans by the elderly using government administrative data to evaluate how these choices evolve over time. We find large "foregone savings" from not choosing the lowest cost plan that has grown over time. We develop a structural framework to decompose the changes in "foregone welfare" from inconsistent choices into choice set changes and choice functio...

Gender differences in reward sensitivity and information processing were examined in two studies using a dynamic decision-making task. In Experiment 1, the optimal strategy involved forgoing an option that provided larger immediate rewards in favor of one yielding larger delayed rewards. In Experiment 2, the optimal strategy was to select the option that provided larger immediate rewards becaus...

“Making an informed decision” implies that more information leads to better decisions, yet it may be the case that additional information biases decisions in a systematic and sometimes detrimental manner. In the present study we examined the effect of additional information on older adults’ decision-making using a task for which available rewards were dependent on the participant’s recent patte...

A player’s knowledge of her own actions and the corresponding own payoffs may enable her to infer or form belief about what the payoffs would have been if she had played differently. In studies of low-information game settings, however, players’ ex-post inferences and beliefs have been largely ignored by quantitative learning models. For games with large strategy spaces, the omission may seriou...

Decision makers faced with an opportunity to learn the outcome of a foregone alternative must balance anticipated regret, should that information be unfavorable, with the potential benefits of this information in reducing experienced regret. Counterfactual seeking, the choice to learn more about foregone alternatives, may be a functional, regret-regulating strategy for individuals already exper...

W e consider a supply chain with a supplier that sells to a retailer under a revenue-sharing arrangement. Demand is uncertain and unobservable to the supplier. We assume that the retailer is rational, that is, the retailer behaves opportunistically and underreports sales revenues to the supplier whenever such underreporting is profitable. Assuming the supplier has the ability to audit the retai...