Online auction is an essence of many modern markets, particularly networked markets, in which information about goods, agents, and outcomes is revealed over a period of time, and the agents must make irrevocable decisions without knowing future information. Optimal stopping theory, especially the classic secretary problem, is a powerful tool for analyzing such online scenarios which generally r...

Engineering Change Order or ECO phase is always challenging for any family of chip design. High Performance Microprocessors are largest and most complex overall design within Semiconductor Industry as a whole. To add further, there are additional design and methodology challenge related to bleeding edge of process nodes. Hence, current and future microprocessor design requires a set of well pla...

This note reanalyzes a non·zero-sum game version of the secretary problem recently treated by Kurano, Nakagami and Yasuda [3], under a modified formulation of the problem. The equilibrium derived differs from the former one and has an interesting assymptotic behavior which reconfirms a main theorem formerly proved by Presman and Sonin [4]. Th" equilibrium value in the limit is a positive number...

We consider a generalization of the secretary problem where contracts are temporary, and for a fixed duration γ. This models online hiring of temporary employees, or online auctions for re-usable resources. The problem is related to the question of finding a large independent set in a random unit interval graph.

A software agent is a program that effectively uses the network and remote processing sites to conduct differnt tasks on behalf of its originator. If required, the agent can communicate with the environments and/or other agents. This also includes replication of agents and possibly also propagation of processes. An important problem with an agent-based solution is security. Security might be di...

This paper is concerned with two-person non-zero-sum game versions of the secretary problem. A remarkable feature of our models compared with previous ones is that Nash equilibrium strategies are different for two players, i.e. one player should behave more hastily, and the other less hastily, than in the secretary problem.

This paper analyses a variation of the secretary problem in which two selectors, with different fields of interest, each want to appoint one of the n candidates with as much expertise as possible in their field. Selectors simultaneously vote to accept or reject: Unanimous decisions are respected and candidates with a split decision are hired with probability p. Each candidate arrives with exper...

This paper is composed of two related parts. In the first, we present a dynamic programming procedure for finding optimal policies for a class of sequential search problems that includes the well-known “secretary problem.” In the second, we propose a stochastic model of choice behavior for this class of problems and test the model with two extant data sets. We conclude that the previously repor...