Managers of microfinance institutions (MFIs) typically lack the information required to optimize loan contract terms and marketing strategies. We outline a replicable randomized-control methodology that addresses MFI contracting and marketing strategies directly, and we present evidence from the first implementation of this methodology. We estimate consumer loan demand sensitivities with respec...

In this paper Basel regulation is modeled in Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework. For this purpose, using data from 1981-2017 for Iran, capital adequacy as an importance regulation is modeled. Results show Basel regulation has procyclical effect. According to the results of the model and according to the realities of economy and banking system of Iran, in recession, lending ...

This paper presents a conceptual framework for explaining credit union (CU) loan delinquency and profitability in developing countries, together with empirical estimation for a unique sample of Latin American CUs. Delinquency and profitability were found to be responsive to the incentives that CUs create for their borrowers to repay loans. These incentives include loan and deposit rates, the us...

INTRODUCTION There is an ongoing shortage of rural healthcare providers relative to urban healthcare providers worldwide. Many strategies have been implemented to increase the distribution of rural healthcare providers, and financial incentives such as loan repayment programs have become popular means to both recruit and retain healthcare providers in rural communities. Studies detailing the ef...

This study focuses on the supplemented strategies of microfinance institutions (MFIs), in which the MFI offers nonfinancial services, such as entrepreneurship related knowledge, in addition to financial services to impoverished borrowers at the bottom of the pyramid (BoP). We examine two contextual factors–foreign direct investment (FDI) and loan defaults–to better understand the relationship b...

Credit agents in microfinance institutions (MFIs) must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the MFI’s objectives. We show that while giving incentives has no cost in for-profit MFIs, it is costly in propoor MFIs: When repayment and wealth are positively correlated, a pro-poor MFI cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the p...