نتایج جستجو برای: d89

تعداد نتایج: 64  

1999
Larry G. Epstein Michael Peters

In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These specifications are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature and exclude mechanisms that are natural in a competitive environment, for example, mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms chosen by competitors. This paper constructs a set of mechanisms that is univ...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2009
Miltiadis Makris

We investigate the private provision of a discrete public good. When the size and decomposition of the group are certain, such a problem has, in general, multiple equilibria. Yet, if it is commonly believed that some individuals may be altruists and that the size of the group is a Poisson random variable then equilibrium is unique. If the decomposition uncertainty is very small and the expected...

Journal: :Physical review 2022

The study of the primordial black hole (PBH) gravitational collapse process requires determination a critical energy density perturbation threshold ${\ensuremath{\delta}}_{\mathrm{c}}$, which depends on equation state universe at time PBH formation. Up to now, majority analytical and numerical techniques calculate ${\ensuremath{\delta}}_{\mathrm{c}}$ by assuming constant equation-of-state (EoS)...

2010
Luca Anderlini Leonardo Felli Alessandro Riboni Gillian Hadfield Andrea Mattozzi Jean-Laurent Rosenthal

All Courts rule ex-post, after most economic decisions are sunk. This can generate a time-inconsistency problem. From an ex-ante perspective, Courts will have the ex-post temptation to be excessively lenient. This observation is at the root of the rule of precedent, known as stare decisis. Stare decisis forces Courts to weigh the benefits of leniency towards the current parties against the bene...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2001
Eiichi Miyagawa

We consider the Shapley-Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, ex post individually rational, ex post budget balanced, and “collusion-proof.” In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advance, and the objects are reallocated according to the (unique) core assignment of the Shapley-Scar...

2014
Michela Ponzo Vincenzo Scoppa Federico

Does the Home Advantage Depend on Crowd Support? Evidence from Same-Stadium Derbies We investigate to what extent crowd support contributes to the home advantage in soccer, disentangling this effect from other mechanisms such as players’ familiarity with the stadium and travel fatigue. To evaluate the relevance of crowd support in determining home advantage we analyze same-stadium derbies (matc...

2002
Nabil I. Al-Najjar Luca Anderlini Leonardo Felli

We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents — their consequences and probabilities are known — but are such that every description of such events necessarily leaves out relevant features that have a non-negligible impact on the parties’ expected utilities. Using a simple co-insurance problem as backdrop, we introduce a model whe...

2001
Michele Bernasconi Oliver Kirchkamp

To understand the effect of fiscal policy on the private sector we have to comprehend how expectations about fiscal variables are formed. However, little is known about the way people form expectations about fiscal variables: no undercutting theory exists, not to say empirical evidence. The problem is that “expectations are unobservable” (Bertola and Drazen [BD93, p.16]). We generate observable...

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