This paper extends the recent investigation of Tahvonen and Withagen (1996, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 20, 1775}1795) for costly and thus sluggish instead of instantaneous reductions in emissions. In addition to the social optimum, the paper investigates the competitive equilibrium. This plausible extension allows to derive limit cycles as the outcome for both, the social optimum ...

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities....

This paper endogenizes the timing of bilateral contracting between one principal and multiple agents in the presence of externalities. Contracting simultaneously with all agents is optimal for the principal if externalities become weaker the more an agent trades. If instead externalities become stronger, sequential negotiations might benefit the principal as they lower the agents’ outside optio...

A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient pa...

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our mor...

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently ...

We introduce social capital accumulation into a neoclassical model, showing how it differs from physical and human capital accumulation. We take the view that social capital is crucial to the enjoyment of socially provided goods and that it is mainly accumulated by means of participation to social activities. Under-investment in social capital may lead a growing economy to fall into a social po...

In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when bidders are risk-neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed strategy equilibria are ex post allocationand interim expected payment-equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standar...

Examples of test electromagnetic waves on a Friedmann–Lemâıtre– Robertson–Walker (FLRW) background are constructed from explicit perturbations of the FLRW space–times describing gravitational waves propagating in the isotropic universes. A possible physical mechanism for the production of the test electromagnetic waves is shown to be the coupling of the gravitational waves with a test magnetic ...

Innovation by users is now understood to be an important part of innovative activity in the economy. In this paper we explore the implications of adding innovation by users to existing models of social welfare that currently assume innovation by manufacturers only. We find this addition removes several inefficiencies, and that social welfare is likely to be increased by the presence of user inn...