نتایج جستجو برای: d23

تعداد نتایج: 385  

2005
Pradeep Dubey John Geanakoplos Ori Haimanko PRADEEP DUBEY JOHN GEANAKOPLOS ORI HAIMANKO

We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is su¢ cient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses). Keywords: Envy, Pride, Wages, Prizes, Bonus JEL Classi…cation: C72, D01, D23, L14.

2001
Matthias Kräkel Dirk Sliwka

In an asymmetric tournament model with endogenous risk choice by the agents it is shown that equilibrium efforts decrease (increase) with risk if abilities are sufficiently similar (different). Risk also affects winning probabilities. The interaction of both effects is analyzed. JEL classification: D23, J3, M12.

2004
Steffen Huck Pedro Rey Biel

In this paper we study the mechanics of “leading by example” in teams. Leadership is beneficial for the entire team when agents are conformists, i.e., dislike effort differentials. We also show how leadership can arise endogenously and discuss what type of leader benefits a team most. JEL codes: C72; D23; D63; J31; L23.

Journal: :Int. J. Game Theory 2012
Peter H. Knudsen Lars Peter Østerdal

Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on mergingand splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments. JEL classification: C71, D23, D71.

Journal: :Revue d'économie industrielle 2021

De la capacité de l’entrepreneur à concevoir une organisation apte créer des canaux d’information suffisamment robustes dépendent nature innovations effectuées, façon dont sont exploitées les connaissances scientifiques et techniques, l’usage qui est fait l’esprit créatif. C’est cette aune qu’il convient juger du comportement entrepreneurial, rythmes imposés par finance, allouées ressources hum...

2007
BENGT HOLMSTROM PAUL MILGROM

We explore the twin hypotheses (i) that high-performance incentives, worker ownership of assets, and worker freedom from direct controls are complementary instruments for motivating workers, and (ii) that such instruments can be expected to covary positively in cross-sectional data. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence, particularly that on the organization, compensation, and ma...

Journal: :Journal of the American Chemical Society 2006
Bogdan Tarus John E Straub D Thirumalai

In the amyloid fibrils formed from long fragments of the amyloid beta-protein (Abeta-protein), the monomers are arranged in parallel and lie perpendicular to the fibril axis. The structure of the monomers satisfies the amyloid self-organization principle; namely, the low free energy state of the monomer maximizes the number of intra- and interpeptide contacts and salt bridges. The formation of ...

1996
Larry D. Qiu Zhigang Tao Susheng Wang Oliver Williamson

We develop a model to study the implications of a legal environment on the organization of software production. We show that contract enforcement a®ects the organizational mode (i.e., in-house versus outsourcing) of customized software development while copyright protection determines the introduction of package software. When copyright protection is weak, only customized software will be devel...

2011
David Rahman

In this paper I prove a Folk theorem with T -private communication equilibria with an imperfect monitoring structure that may be public, private, and conditionally dependent or independent. I show that an efficient outcome is approachable as players become patient if every disobedience from efficiency is detectable by some player and some not necessarily efficient action profile. I also show th...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2008
Jens Josephson Karl Wärneryd

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a wellestablished observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Applying stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for...

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