We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one o...

The paper presents simulation of two classic duopoly games, those of Cournot and Bertrand. The simulation is done with a very simple Discrete Event Simulation system, aGPSS, developed for economics students. With the Cournot model one can study under which conditions the Cournot solution will be obtained even if the parties lack knowledge about demand and costs. The Bertrand model, with stochas...

This paper shows that the cost as well as the effectiveness of technology has a differential impact on technology adoption under two alternative modes of competition. If the cost of the technology is high, Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt technology than Cournot competition unless the effectiveness of the technology is very low. On the contrary, if the cost of the tec...

Abstract We construct a Cournot model with uncertainty in the number of firms industry. such an as Poisson game and characterize set equilibria after deriving novel properties distribution. When marginal costs are zero, increases expected ( n ) for $$n\ge 3$$ n ≥ 3 ...

Studies on information sharing in oligopolies focus either Cournot or Bertrand markets. We consider a Cournot–Bertrand market where owners provide strategic managerial incentives and can share the details of their compensation contracts. find that firm punishes its manager for sales, whereas rewards sales. Both firms contract if firms' products are sufficiently differentiated. However, product ...

We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. We implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency. For Cournot markets, we replicate a pattern known from previous experiments....

In a simple agent-based model of a small oligopoly nonrenewable natural resource model, the agents, communicating solely through the market price, sometimes exhibit collusion-like behavior, sometimes Cournot-like behavior. The collusion-like behavior is shown to arise when di erences between the agents are small. Conversely, the Cournot-like behavior is shown to result from di erences in produc...

We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot–Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot– Nash outcome and one ...

We introduce a simple model of oligopolistic competition where firms first build capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choose a reservation price at which they are willing to supply their capacities. This model describes many markets more realistically than the model of Kreps and Scheinkman [Kreps, D., Scheinkman, J., 1983. Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition y...

An adaptive oligopoly model, where the demand function is isoelastic and the competitors operate under constant marginal costs, is considered. The Cournot equilibrium point then loses stability through a subcritical Neimark bifurcation. The present paper focuses some global bifurcations, which precede the Neimark bifurcation, and produce other attractors which coexist with the still attractive ...