This paper argues that truth is by nature context-dependent – that no truth can be applied regardless of context. I call this “strong contextualism”. Some objections to this are considered and rejected, principally: that there are universal truths given to us by physics, logic and mathematics; and that claiming “no truths are universal” is self-defeating. Two “models” of truth are suggested to ...

Evidence for contextualism primarily consists of intuitions generated in response to a variety of thought experiments. I argue that these intuitions are subject to experimenter bias and bias that results from exclusive reliance on absolute truth-value judgments. Unless these forms of experimental bias are controlled for, both contextualists and their opponents are attempting to give semantic an...

This paper develops an improved contextualist account of embedded epistemic modals. I focus primarily on three prominent objections to contextualism from embedding: first, that contextualism mischaracterizes subjects’ states ofmind; second, that contextualism fails to predict howepistemicmodals are obligatorily linked to the subject in attitude ascriptions; and third, that contextualism fails t...

Philosophers inspired by Wittgenstein have been waging a guerrilla war against compositional, truth-conditional semantics (CTCS) since the rise to dominance of that approach to the study of meaning in the early 1970s. The neo-Wittgensteinian resistance involves two elements: first, a focus on the way our assessment of the truth conditions of sentences changes in various, seemingly open-ended wa...